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Figure 1: The ‘downstream flow’ of ‘transpolitical hydraulics’ 
Pre-political collective-boundary-making facilitates self-constitution and self-determination, 
addressing the matter of “who are the people” by bounding the demos (DX) and addressing 
“where is rightfully theirs” by bounding that demos’ territory (TX). These bounding decisions 
can be understood to “flow downstream,” from the pre-political first order to the political 


























































































Figure 2: The trans-polity balance of Canadian federalism 
In federal systems like Canada’s, pre-political bounding decisions provide the demos of each 
federal subunit, including that of Nunavut, with a measure of shared rule (DSHARED RULE). As 
this provision is constitutionally entrenched, Nunavut’s pre-political demotic boundaries ‘flow 
downstream,’ acting on voting rights of individuals in other subunits, such as Ontario 
(RVOTING). These downstream flows condition – but do not quash – Ontarians’ voting rights. 
























































Figure 3: The abnormal-justice challenge of Ford v. Quebec 
Federal systems insure each subunit enjoys not just shared rule but also self rule (DSELF RULE). 
This pre-political bounding decision ‘flows downstream,’ impacting individual rights, 
potentially including rights to freedom of expression (REXPRESSION). Canada’s constitution gives 
little clue as to the appropriate trans-polity balance between subunit self-rule and individual 
expression. Thus, in Ford v. Quebec, decision-makers faced an abnormal-justice challenge. 
How far could Quebec self rule ‘flow downstream’ without abusing the individual-expression 
rights of Anglos? How far could Anglos’ rights push ‘upstream’ without undermining Quebec 














































































































































Figure 4: The metapolitics of Reynolds v. Sims 
In Alabama, demotic bounding provided shared rule (DSHARED RULE) to low-population counties, 
constraining voting rights (RVOTING) of individual Alabamans (Step 1). Plaintiffs launched an 
individual-rights challenge (Step 2). Plaintiffs noted county-based shared rule was not entrenched 
in the U.S. constitution – in effect, that counties were not a ‘self’ owed self-determination (Step 3). 
In this manner, plaintiffs framed the dispute not as trans-polity, between individuals and a self-
determining polity, but intrapolity, between second-order co-citizens. The court agreed with this 
framing (Step 4). Thus, when the plaintiffs’ claims pushed ‘upstream,’ they encountered no first-
order resistance (Step 5). The claims, rather than constraining shared rule by way of a trans-polity 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Reconciling Shared Rule: Liberal Theory, Electoral-
Districting Law and “National Group”
Representation in Canada
AARON JOHN SPITZER University of Bergen
Introduction
In representative liberal democracies, the right to vote is sacrosanct.
According to section 3 of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
“Every citizen has a right to vote in an election of members of the House
of Commons or of a legislative assembly.” Upholding this right presents
myriad challenges, including determining by what principles representation
should be apportioned. In Canada, representation is apportioned through
territorially based districts. These districts must be periodically reshaped
and their number and composition of electors thereby adjusted in a
manner that guards voting rights while still facilitating expression of the
popular will. In the Charter era, Canada’s courts have become key
players in this balancing act (Courtney, 2001). Their electoral-boundaries
jurisprudence figures large in redistricting efforts, not least because the
courts have proved willing to strike down “discriminatory treatment of
voters under a particular set of electoral boundaries” (53).
Drawing non-discriminatory districts is challenging even in unitary
states, where individuals are the sole rights bearers. Additional complexities
arise in federal states, where representation attaches not only to individuals
but also to territorial polities. Even where the relationship between individ-
ual and polity-based representation is inscribed in law, as in the overweight-
ing of less populous regions in Canada’s Senate, the consequences may be
controversial. Thornier still is the case of apportionment in consociational
states, where rights-bearing polities are not (or not solely) territorially
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defined, but are discrete ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious “peoples.”
From Afghanistan to Macedonia, from South Africa to Northern Ireland,
consociational arrangements are on the rise (McCrudden and O’Leary,
2013). Indeed, observes McCulloch, “Nearly all the peace accords signed
in the last two decades have included power sharing” (2014: 1). Also on
the rise, consequently, are constitutional clashes between the rights of
“peoples” and the rights of individuals (Issacharoff, 2008).
Such clashes arise in diverse circumstances. They emerge when states
assert jurisdiction over new ethnocultural polities, as when the United States
claimed sovereignty over Pacific territories (Katz, 1992). They arise when
states enter new power-sharing arrangements, as European states did fol-
lowing the Maastricht Treaty (Pildes, 2004: 34). They appear when
power sharing is externally imposed, as in the peace plan for Bosnia
(McCrudden and O’Leary, 2013). And likely most frequently, clashes
between individual and consociational apportionment appear when
restive internal groups demand changes to the terms of their constitutional
participation (Issacharoff, 2008: 232). Such is the case in Canada, where
conflicts between the existing rights of individuals and emergent appeals
for representation by Indigenous peoples and francophone minority com-
munities outside Quebec (FMCs) have, in recent decades, become fraught.
Like all federal democracies, Canada apportions representation both to
individuals and federal subunits. But Canada also comprises three constitu-
tionally recognized “distinct national groups” (Kymlicka, 1995: 12), anglo-
phones, francophones and Indigenous peoples. Though these “national
groups” are protected and empowered in part through federalism (Quebec
for francophones, Nunavut for Inuit), federalism does not exhaust their
rights. Ethnonational power sharing finds expression outside Canada’s
federal framework, through consociation. Consociation has become partic-
ularly relevant in the wake of the adoption of the Constitution Act, 1982, the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and associated developments in
Indigenous and “official-language minority” jurisprudence. Thus, in
Canada, courts are increasingly compelled to grapple with appeals for
polity-based representation in a consociational dimension.
In such cases, which should prevail: the time-honoured rights of indi-
viduals, or fresh demands of “national groups”? Such clashes are vexing.
Scholars focusing on this topic have urged judges to proceed cautiously,
avoiding reflexively approaching such cases through the lens of liberal indi-
vidualism (Pildes, 2004; Issacharoff, 2008; McCrudden and O’Leary,
2013). Issacharoff says it well: “Courts should be wary of following their
impulses to treat such … conflicts about the structure of political systems
as familiar claims of individual rights” (2008: 231). Scholars such as
Katz (1992) and White (1993a) have observed that, where courts thwart
consociational accommodations in multinational states, they may compro-
mise the state’s legitimacy.
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In Canada, it is not clear that courts have heeded this warning. Judicial,
political and scholarly encounters with the topic have been muddled. This
article seeks to contribute theoretical clarity. I begin by tracing the rise of
appeals for “national group” apportionment, which, in the case of
Indigenous peoples, spiked in the 1990s, and which for FMCs has
become common in the past few years. I then develop a normative frame-
work for thinking about, and working through, consociational apportion-
ment. This framework draws on the key liberal principles of
individualism, egalitarianism and universalism. I show that the last of
these, universalism, is at once the least familiar to students of apportionment
and also, when thinking about consociation, the principle of primary impor-
tance. This is because universalism is a “first order” principle that must be
addressed prior to grappling with individualism and egalitarianism. Finally,
I analyze the relevant case law surrounding Indigenous and FMC represen-
tation against the backdrop of this theoretical framework, showing how
Abstract. Canada, like all representative democracies, apportions representation to individuals;
also, like all federal states, it accords polity-based representation to federal subunits. But Canada
is additionally a consociational state, comprising three constitutionally recognized “national
groups”: anglophones, francophones and Indigenous peoples. These groups share power and
bear rights beyond the bounds of the federal system. In recent decades, Indigenous peoples and
francophones have appealed for representation as “national groups,” leading to constitutional chal-
lenges. Courts have either failed to address the constitutionality of “national group” representation
or have rejected it as irreconcilable with individual voting rights. I suggest the former is unnecessary
and the latter procedurally illogical. Drawing on the liberal principles of individualism, egalitarian-
ism and universalism, I develop a framework contextualizing such representation within liberal
theory. I then deploy this framework to analyze recent Canadian case law. I show that appeals
for “national group” representation should be approached not through the lens of individual
rights, but rather through the “constitutionally prior” lens of universalism.
Résumé. Le Canada, à l’instar de toutes les démocraties représentatives, répartit la représentation
entre les individus; de plus, comme tous les États fédéraux, il accorde aux sous-unités fédérales une
représentation fondée sur la politie. Mais le Canada est aussi un État consociationnel, composé de
trois " groupes nationaux " reconnus par la Constitution : les anglophones, les francophones et les
peuples autochtones. Ces groupes partagent le pouvoir et ont des droits dépassant les limites du
système fédéral. Au cours des dernières décennies, les peuples autochtones et les francophones
ont réclamé une représentation en tant que « groupe national », ce qui a donné lieu à des contesta-
tions constitutionnelles. Les tribunaux n’ont pas abordé la constitutionnalité de la représentation des
« groupes nationaux » ou l’ont rejetée comme étant inconciliable avec le droit de vote individuel.
J’estime que la première position est superflue et que la seconde est illogique du point de vue des
règles procédurales. En m’appuyant sur les principes libéraux de l’individualisme, de l’égalitarisme
et de l’universalisme, j’élabore un cadre contextualisant une telle représentation au sein de la théorie
libérale. Je déploie ensuite ce cadre pour analyser la jurisprudence canadienne récente. Je montre
que les appels en faveur d’une représentation du « groupe national » ne devraient pas être
abordés sous l’angle des droits individuels, mais plutôt sous celui de l’universalisme « constitution-
nellement antérieur ».
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approaching these cases through “first order” universalism may lend clarity
to consociational apportionment in Canada.
National Groups and Consociational Representation
Consociation of “national groups” has long been a feature of Canada;
indeed, Noel calls Canada “arguably the first consociational democracy”
(1993:46). In sections 93 and 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the
Catholic and Protestant religions and French and English languages were
granted distinct legal protection. The Supreme Court, from its inception,
has by law been disproportionately francophone. Overweighting of franco-
phones is traditional in institutions such as the federal cabinet. Meanwhile,
through historic treaties, Indigenous nations have for centuries been recog-
nized as distinct from the broader Canadian polity. Even consociational
apportionment is not new. Guaranteed representation of anglophones was
long required in Quebec (Courtney, 2001: 47), while in Nova Scotia,
dual-member districts once provided joint anglophone/francophone repre-
sentation (Royal Commission on Electoral Reform, 1991: 179). However,
as I will now show, calls for representation of Indigenous and FMC polities
have recently become more common.
Calls for consociational representation for FMCs
The adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 provided fran-
cophones with a number of explicit consociational guarantees. The
Charter’s sections 16 to 23 address official-language protections.
Building on these protections, courts have progressively expanded the
polity-based education and healthcare-management rights of FMCs.
According to Foucher, this jurisprudence has in effect affirmed FMCs’
right “to live in their own language” (2005: 146).
Theorists, meanwhile, have explored whether FMCs are owed, or indeed
already enjoy, constitutionally protected cultural self-rule—what has been
termed “non-territorial autonomy” (Chouinard, 2014; Elkins, 1992;
Nieguth, 2009; Poirier, 2008, 2012). Representation is often viewed as a cor-
ollary of such autonomy (Kymlicka, 1995: 32). Indeed, certain of the above
authors (Elkins, 1992: 16), as well as others (Leger-Haskell, 2009: Magnet,
1995), have proposed apportioning polity-based representation to FMCs.
Francophone advocacy groups have at times pressed for such representation.
For example, during the debate over the Charlottetown Accord, groups rec-
ommended that one senator from each province represent the official-lan-
guage minority of that province (Kymlicka, 1993: 62).
At the same time, traditionally francophone districts have increasingly
come under threat. Thrice recently, FMCs in New Brunswick and Nova
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Scotia, drawing in part on language rights unique to “national groups,” have
challenged electoral maps that submerged them into anglophone districts in
the name of voter parity. The ensuing cases were all decided in favour of the
FMCs. Yet the rulings, and the legislative and scholarly discussions flowing
therefrom, lacked theoretical clarity. As I will show, despite appeals by
FMCs for representation that flows from their consociational status as a
“national group,” courts have failed to say whether such rights exist.
Calls for consociational representation for Indigenous peoples
Indigenous peoples, too, are among Canada’s “national groups.” Prior to
colonization they were sovereign; in recent decades they have called for
internal self‐determination (Coulthard, 2014: 64). Indigenous rights and
protections are variously said to be rooted in natural rights, historic procla-
mations and treaties, international law, and in modern Canadian political,
constitutional and jurisprudential developments. In the Constitution Act,
1982 and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, two key Indigenous rights
were recognized. Section 35 of the Constitution Act affirmed certain
Indigenous “existing rights,” including (per federal government and court
interpretations) the “inherent right of self-government.” Meanwhile,
section 25 of the Charter often called the “non-derogation clause,” antici-
pated clashes between individual and Indigenous rights, buffering—
perhaps even blocking—diminution of the latter (Arbour, 2003).
Some scholars have suggested the “inherent right of self-government”
carries with it a corollary right to representation in public government
(Schouls, 1996: 739). Others have suggested guaranteed representation is
owed to Indigenous peoples as a consequence of their cession of sover-
eignty in the same way British Columbia and Newfoundland acquired
seats in Parliament in exchange for joining Canada (Knight, 2001: 1108).
At least one scholar has proposed that certain historic treaties may guarantee
Indigenous representation (Ladner, 1997). Finally, some thinkers suggest
Indigenous peoples are owed power in Parliament because of their
unique constitutional status as fiduciary dependents (Royal Commission
on Electoral Reform, 1991: 182).
During the 1990s, numerous plans for guaranteed Indigenous represen-
tation were drafted. In 1991, the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform
proposed creating Aboriginal Electoral Districts (1991: 182). In 1992, the
Charlottetown Accord included provisions for Indigenous representation
in Parliament. In 1995, the Liberal government’s “Inherent Right Policy”
urged “specific guarantees” of Indigenous representation in public govern-
ment. In 1996, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples suggested
Indigenous self‐government might include “sharing power in joint govern-
mental institutions, with guaranteed representation for the nations and
peoples involved” (1996: 106). In the 1990s, Quebec, New Brunswick,
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Nova Scotia and the Northwest Territories explored, but did not implement,
guaranteed Indigenous representation (Niemczak and Jutras, 2008).
Today, in three provinces, electoral boundaries laws give Indigenous
peoples specific consideration. In Alberta, the presence of “an Indian
reserve or a Metis settlement” is among multiple factors that, taken together,
qualify up to four districts for “exceptional” departure from voter parity. In
Newfoundland and Labrador, one district enjoys special exemption from
parity largely on the grounds “that persons of Aboriginal descent form
the majority.” In Ontario, “representation of Indigenous people” is among
the reasons two low-population, heavily Indigenous districts were formed
in 2017.
Beyond these narrow exceptions, polity-based Indigenous representa-
tion has gone unimplemented, and discussions surrounding it have faded.
This is in part due to hesitations among Indigenous peoples to adopt alien
institutions (White, 1993b) or legitimize colonial rule (Knight, 2001: 192).
But it is also due to vigorous non-Indigenous opposition to, and lack of
legal clarity surrounding, the integration of consociational Indigenous repre-
sentation with existing representational rights of Canadians as individuals
(Schouls, 1996: 748).
This clash was exemplified by the first and only charter challenge to con-
front Indigenous consociational representation. In Friends of Democracy
v. Northwest Territories, the court in effect condemned the notion that
Indigenous power sharing could permissibly compromise the voting rights
of Canadians at large. As this article will show, the reasoning of the court
sits uncomfortably with liberal theory, and, indeed, is at odds with a
seminal subsequent ruling relating to Indigenous section 25 and 35 rights.
Contextualizing Consociational Apportionment in Liberal Theory
As noted above, in recent decades, Canadian electoral boundary makers
have encountered appeals for representation of francophone and
Indigenous polities. Electoral boundary makers as well as politicians,
jurists and scholars have struggled to make sense of these appeals and rec-
oncile them with existing rights of individuals. I suggest these struggles are
exacerbated by the absence of a framework contextualizing consociational
apportionment within liberal theory. As guarding individual rights is liber-
alism’s raison d’être, liberal theory provides a useful lens through which to
explore, and make better sense of, apportionment controversies. Liberal the-
orists, such as Kukathas, identify three key liberal principles: individualism,
egalitarianism and universalism (1992: 108). I suggest apportionment may
be usefully studied through the lens of, and the interrelationship between,
these three principles. What follows is an exploration of these principles
as they relate to Canadian apportionment.
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The individualism principle in apportionment
In liberal political theory, individualism is the principle that the irreducible
rights-bearing unit is the individual (Kymlicka, 1989: 140). Per this princi-
ple, the state should not reward, punish or prescriptively categorize individ-
uals on the basis of group affiliations (for example, race, class, gender) but
rather should treat them in a manner that is “difference blind.” Assessing
apportionment in the light of individualism, then, involves determining
whether a districting scheme is “difference blind” versus whether (and in
what way) it subsumes individuals into groups.
As individualism hinges on “blindness,” a maximally liberal represen-
tational scheme might be expected to take no note of voters’ affiliations. Yet
in many electoral systems, including the first-past-the-post system of
Canada, this would be illogical and even intolerable. As Karlan observes,
“The instrumental purpose of voting—having one’s preferences taken
into account in choosing public officials—necessarily involves aggregating
the votes of individuals to achieve a collective outcome” (1993: 249).
Moreover, for voting to have meaning, apportionment must aggregate not
just any electors but those who share politically salient interests.
Achieving meaningful aggregation requires deliberate departure from
difference blindness, making apportionment a rare instance where liberal-
ism embraces difference-conscious lawmaking. Hence, few apportionment
schemes are individualistic on their face. Indeed, some that are ostensibly
individualistic have been judged unconstitutional precisely because they
fail to provide power to, and thus abridge the rights of, voters of certain
groups (Issacharoff et al., 2007: 538). For example, in the United States,
courts have found that the politically salient interests of residents of
racial minority neighbourhoods are denied when their electoral preferences
are drowned out via citywide at-large apportionment.
It must be emphasized, however, that liberal tolerance for grouping
voters for the purpose of districting is distinct from assigning rights to
groups themselves (Gerken, 2001). The US Supreme Court emphatically
denied in Shaw v. Hunt that the “right to an undiluted vote … belongs to
the minority as a group and not to its individual members. It does not”
(1996: §917). Instead, aggregating voters who share politically salient inter-
ests is said to provide each voter with a meaningful vote. Hence, in the
above scenario, it is not the racial minority neighbourhood that bears
rights, but the individual residents therein.
It must also be noted that, though liberalism embraces aggregation for
purposes of representation, it may condemn certain types of aggregations.
This hostility typically relates to the kind of group being recognized and,
sometimes, to the overtness of that recognition. The most common
method of aggregating voters is by territory, which requires eschewing
“blindness” only so voters may be grouped based on the commonality of
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where they live. Liberalism’s acceptance of geographic aggregation is
underscored by its embrace of the traditional districting principles of “con-
tiguity” and “compactness.”
As well, representation may be apportioned to voters who form a “com-
munity of interest.” Liberal justice usually condones, and may even insist
upon, grouping voters by community-of-interest-related factors that corre-
spond easily with proximity, such as socioeconomic level, cultural heritage,
employment type or municipal residence. Such aggregations lead to districts
that are, for instance, predominantly blue collar or Italian-American or com-
posed of military personnel or limited to residents of a specific city. More
controversial are groupings that hinge on immutable, politically divisive
traits like race. In the US, the legality of so-called “affirmative racial gerry-
manders” has been hotly contested, especially when such gerrymanders
defy geographic compactness, resulting in odd-shaped districts.
In Canada, apportionment questions relating to liberal individualism
have provoked legislative, though not constitutional, controversy. As repre-
sentatives in Canada are elected from geographic districts, voters must be
aggregated by proximity. Moreover, in affirming such districting principles
as “community of interest” and “minority representation” (Courtney, 2001:
159), courts have confirmed that the Charter rejects “difference blindness”
in favour of aggregating individuals by commonalities beyond mere prox-
imity. The limits of such aggregation are contested. As Pal notes, boundary
makers have long wrangled over the proper definition of “community of
interest,” disagreeing as to whether groupings based on race and ethnicity
are desirable or, conversely, intolerable (2015: 258). Courts have had
little to say on this matter (Courtney, 2001: 168). Even less judicially
clear is whether “community of interest” aggregation may, or indeed
must, compromise other districting values, such as those that I will
discuss next, related to egalitarianism.
The egalitarianism principle in apportionment
In liberal theory, egalitarianism holds that all individuals are moral equals
and should be treated as such, enjoying legal parity vis-à-vis one another
(Kymlicka, 1989: 140). Assessing apportionment in the light of egalitarian-
ism requires determining whether an electoral map treats individuals as
equals or whether (and to what degree) it instead overrepresents some
and underrepresents others.
As liberalism rests on the political equality of individuals, then a max-
imally liberal apportionment scheme would provide representation that is
“equal.” But as Pitkin famously observed (1967), representation is a
concept understood in multifarious ways. How one understands it affects
whether one feels it has been apportioned equally. I suggest there are
many dimensions of representational egalitarianism, of which three are
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relevant here: formal equality, substantive equality and “community of
interest” equality.
Formal equality is said to result when apportionment adheres to repre-
sentation by population. Under strict “rep by pop,” representatives are
elected by and/or represent equal numbers—of people, citizens, qualified
voters, or some other subset of individuals. This practice purportedly
gives electors equal “power” or provides constituents equal “weight.”
Where districts are not equipopulous, they are “malapportioned.”
Individuals in districts with a greater population than average are “under-
represented” and their voting power “diluted.” Individuals in low-popula-
tion districts are in turn “overrepresented.”
Of course, formal egalitarianism is not the only way representation
may be “equal.” Another way is via “substantive egalitarianism,” valuing
equality of outcome. In Canada, this value is captured in the concept of
“effective representation.” In Dixon v. British Columbia, the BC Supreme
Court identified two essential functions of representation: the “legislative
role,” performed when legislators cast votes, and the “ombudsperson
role,” where representatives act as liaisons between constituents and gov-
ernment (1989: 29). The ombudsperson role is often said to be unusually
difficult in certain types of districts, such as those that are geographically
large or remote. Egalitarian liberals may thus insist that voters in large or
remote districts be numerically overrepresented. In Canada, such overrepre-
sentation is common. It eschews formalistic parity in favour of “substan-
tive” parity, in which it is not the “weight” or “power” of voters that is
equal but the “effectiveness” of representation they receive.
A third dimension of representational egalitarianism is “community of
interest” equality. As noted previously, voters who share politically salient
concerns form communities of interest. Where such communities are split
between multiple electoral districts (“cracked”), or drowned within a
larger district (“stacked”), voters’ ability to elect their favoured candidate,
and thus to have their politically salient interests heard, may be thwarted.
They consequently suffer unequal treatment vis-à-vis members of unim-
paired communities of interest. As Dixon observes, apportionment that
achieves perfect numeric parity and yet preferences the politics of voters
belonging to only certain interest groups is nonetheless inegalitarian
(1968: 272). As with substantive egalitarianism, community of interest
egalitarianism may in Canada permit, or even require, non-equipopulous
districting (Stephanopolous, 2013: 816). Some scholars have speculated
that the Charter not only allows but may even mandate creation of districts
for small but distinct communities of interest (Knight, 2001: 1109).
Unlike apportionment questions relating to individualism, questions
concerning egalitarianism have in Canada been legally contentious.
Departure from formal egalitarianism was once considerable. Adoption of
the Charter resulted in malapportionment challenges, including the
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landmark Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Saskatchewan),
better known as the Carter case. The Supreme Court of Canada’s sole
apportionment decision, Carter held that the right to vote guarantees “not
equality of voting power per se, but the right to ‘effective representation.’”
While “relative parity” is the principal requirement of effective representa-
tion, such representation must also take into account substantive equality
and must consider the “effective representation” of members of various
sorts of aggregations, including communities of interest.
As a consequence of Carter, Canada eschews the strict US standard of
“one person, one vote.” Formal equality and meaningful aggregation are
balanced. Still, subsequent lower-court decisions have affirmed a rough
guideline for permissible deviation from parity of +/−25 per cent.
(Parliament and the majority of Canada’s provinces employ this standard.
A few provinces have tighter guidelines.) Under the +/−25 per cent stan-
dard, “effective representation” may be pursued through the formation of
districts that vary in population as much as 25 per cent above or below
average. Courts have suggested deviations beyond this limit are highly
suspect, except in “exceptional circumstances.”
The universalism principle in apportionment
Disputes involving individualism and egalitarianism will be familiar to stu-
dents of voting rights. In Canada, conflicts over apportionment typically
relate to one or the other of these principles. However, apportionment
must be considered in an additional dimension, informed by universalism.
This is because, like all federal, consociational or otherwise “compound”
states, Canada is not “universal.”
Universalism, according to Gray, is the liberal principle “affirming the
moral unity of the human species and according a secondary importance to
specific historic associations and cultural forms” (1995: xii). Universalism
holds that peoples (nations, linguistic groups, religious groups and so on)
are not politically primordial; they do not bear rights qua group. Rather,
the sole rights-bearing collectivity, and thus the only proper demos, is the
whole. “Universal” political systems consider their citizens to form a
single, indivisible polity. Asch calls universalism “the true ‘one person-
one vote’ orientation to democracy” (1990: 94).
In theory, of course, universalism precludes statehood. But universal-
ism may be seen to stand at odds with another cherished political principle,
self-determination. Self-determination holds that peoples may freely choose
their political status. For a plethora of reasons, there has come to exist what
Margalit and Raz call a “core consensus” supporting the right to self-deter-
mination (1990: 439). Liberals are key members of this consensus; despite
universalist convictions they typically accept and even champion
certain expressions of self-determination (MacMillan, 1998: 127). Self-
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determination, in turn, gives rise to non-universalism, of both an external
and internal variety.
State formation is the clearest manifestation of external self-determina-
tion. Many states, particularly those comprising a single self-determining
people, constitute themselves so representation attaches solely to individu-
als. Other states, constituted by multiple collaborating polities, choose
“compound” arrangements, which preserve for each polity a measure of
internal self-determination. Federal non-universalism provides shared and
self-rule to polities encapsulated in territorial units; in the subspecies of
“multinational” federalism, such as that of Canada, certain encapsulated
polities are peoples, who thereby enjoy de facto internal self-determination.
Consociational non-universalism, meanwhile, provides direct and de jure
internal self-determination to peoples even when they are territorially
diffuse. Consociations may feature elaborate “grand coalitions” of ethnic
blocs, as in Lebanon, or may involve more limited ethnonational power
sharing, as in Canada.
When polities join to constitute a compound state, be it federal, conso-
ciational or otherwise, they must determine how to subdivide power. This
requires confronting a thorny puzzle of democratic theory. Democracy is
“the people deciding,” but how should they decide? Paradoxically, the
“how” of democracy cannot be resolved democratically. Issacharoff calls
this a “first order” dilemma, as it involves defining the powers of the
self-determining demoi upon which democracy is based (2008: 232).
“First order” dilemmas are ideally resolved before, or at least rendered
moot by, the instantiation of the state. In the classic US case, power was
divided pre-politically, with framers striking an agreement and etching it
into an inviolable charter.
Only after “first order” questions are dealt with can framers formalize
what may be considered “second order” rights, rights that address how
power should be distributed to individuals within polities. “Second order”
rights, of course, include difference-blind and egalitarian apportionment.
It may thus be said that decisions related to the principle of universalism
are “constitutionally prior” to those concerning individualism and egalitar-
ianism. As the case of Canadian federalism makes clear, “first order” appor-
tionment produces knock-on effects on “second order” principles. The fact
that Newfoundland and British Columbia have the same number of senators
violates egalitarianism, by providing Newfoundlanders nine times more
senatorial clout per capita than British Columbians.
While these knock-on effects are not without controversy, theorists
seem to view them as more tolerable than those generated by other non-uni-
versal forms, such as consociation. Consociation is not only inegalitarian
but also flies in the face of individualism (McCrudden and O’Leary,
2013: 35; Steiner, 1990: 1551; Wippman, 1998: 231). Consociation, like
federalism, accords power to non-equipopulous groups, but unlike
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federalism, it assigns individuals to those groups based not on where they
live but on who they are, their ethnicity, religion, language and so forth.
In this way, consociation is distinctively and unapologetically difference-
conscious. Hence, classical liberals such as Barry (1975) seem especially
critical of consociation.
Regardless of such opinions, when non-universal structures are consti-
tutionally entrenched, their knock-on effects are ipso facto constitutional.
The overweighting of small provinces in Canada’s federal scheme, or the
overrepresentation of Quebec on the Supreme Court, is effectively
beyond challenge. Likewise, the world’s best-known consociation has
thus far proven legally immune. Belgium’s power-sharing arrangement
apportions representation directly to French and Walloon polities, produc-
ing consequent distortions of individual and egalitarian rights. Twice, law-
suits challenging these distortions have come before the European Court of
Human Rights; both suits were unsuccessful. In effect, the court deemed
these distortions unavoidable “second order” results of a non-universal
scheme that was constitutionally prior (McCrudden and O’Leary, 2013).
Far more vexing are cases of emergent non-universalism (Pildes, 2008:
173). Such cases, though common, are not well theorized (Requejo and
Nagel, 2017: 9). They arise where new claimants to the right of self-deter-
mination emerge in states that are already constituted. States that reject
emergent claims out of hand exhibit a double standard: As Van Dyke
observes, “[In] a multinational state, it is as inappropriate to think of major-
ity rule as it would be in the world as a whole” (1985: 172).
Yet addressing such emergent demands requires engaging with even
thornier challenges than those resolved by constitutional framers. This is
for two reasons. First, emergent claims arise where rules concerning the
“how” of democracy are already entrenched. In Canada, all the seats at
the power-sharing table were long ago assigned to individuals and federal
polities. Where occupants possess seats by right, they are likely to jealously
guard them (Requejo and Nagel, 2017: 14). Emergent polities, such as
Indigenous peoples and FMCs, do not enjoy the luxury of pressing their
claims pre-politically, in the vacuum of a constitutional convention. They
must instead jockey for space at a table that is already full.
The second reason emergent claims are tricky is because they problem-
atize not just the “how” of power sharing, but also the “who.” If democracy
is “the people deciding,” and the “people” are not universal, then who are
the peoples? Are emergent claimants legitimate rights-bearers, or pretenders
to the throne? The aforementioned “core consensus” on the right of self-
determination is, Margalit and Raz note, “but the eye of a raging storm con-
cerning the precise definition of the right, its content, its bearers, and the
proper means of its implementation” (1990: 439). Thinkers feud endlessly
not merely over whether this or that group deserves this or that degree of
sovereignty, but over what principles should guide the investigation.
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Theory, then, like democracy, cannot resolve the “who” of power sharing.
Still, I think we can carve it down to size.
Canada, it seems, features three categories of emergent power-sharing
claimants. The first are groups who are owed self-determination—by their
constitutional status, international law, or otherwise—but wish not to share
power within the public institutions of the state. This is perhaps because
they deem the state illegitimate or seek secession or demand power
sharing confederally (with the state, not within it) or wish merely for inter-
nal autonomy without shared rule. At various times, for various reasons,
certain Indigenous and francophone groups have identified with this cate-
gory. I cannot assess the validity of their secessionist, autonomist or decolo-
nial demands. What I think is certain is that, if they wish not to share power
within Canada, they should not be forced to do so.
The second category of emergent power-sharing claimants are the
inverse of the first: groups that do wish to share power but are clearly not
owed it. Such a group was at the centre of the famous US apportionment
case Reynolds v. Sims. There, the Supreme Court condemned Alabama’s
practice of assigning state senate seats by county rather than population.
Chief Justice Warren, deeming analogies to the special case of the federal
Senate “inapposite,” blasted the notion that counties are rights-bearing
polities. He stated, “Political subdivisions of states … never have been
considered as sovereign entities” (1964: 377). Similarly, in Canada’s
aforementioned Carter case, the court’s minority condemned the non-uni-
versalism of Saskatchewan’s “strict quota of urban and rural ridings” in
which the latter was protected qua polity. (The majority found the
Saskatchewan map sufficiently egalitarian and thus, in effect, declared
concerns about non-universalism moot.)
The final emergent claimants in Canada are the ones relevant to this
article: those who wish to share power within the state and seem morally
and/or legally owed it. As noted previously, FMC claimants might be
owed internal self-determination based on constitutional guarantees;
Indigenous claimants might be owed it on constitutional grounds as
well as due to natural rights, historic proclamations and treaties, and inter-
national law. Yet “who” questions remain. If Indigenous peoples are owed
self-determination, are they owed it collectively, or are First Nations,
Metis and Inuit owed it separately? Are FMCs one polity, or are
Acadians distinct from Ontario francophones? Also, might additional
groups be valid claimants? Do African-Nova Scotians deserve internal
self-determination? Do Doukhobors? These are questions I must leave
for further study (or legal challenge). My purpose, after all, is not to
prove that “national groups” are owed power sharing, but merely to
show that if they are, and if they want it, their claims should be approached
through the lens of non-universalism. This, I will now show, has not
been done.
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Adjudication of “National Group” Representation in Canada
As has been displayed, appeals by emergent groups for consociational power
sharing pose “first order” dilemmas related to the structure of democracy.
Though such dilemmas cannot be resolved democratically, courts long resisted
getting involved, staying clear of the proverbial “thicket” by deeming these
dilemmas non-justiciable. Often, the underlying conflicts festered or were
obviated by brute realpolitik or triggered violent conflict. Increasingly,
however, judges are responding to these emergent demands, thus wading
into the “who” and “how” of democracy (Hirschl, 2004; Issacharoff, 2008;
Pildes, 2004). As will be shown, FMCs and Indigenous peoples have
several times brought “first order” cases before the courts of Canada.
Adjudication of Indigenous representation
In the 1999 case Friends of Democracy v. Northwest Territories, the
Northwest Territories’ Indigenous-majority legislature was accused of vio-
lating the section 3 voting rights of residents in the predominantly non-
Indigenous city of Yellowknife. There, several electoral districts were
severely underrepresented, one exceeding parity by +152 per cent. The ter-
ritorial government defended the scheme, citing “substantive” and “com-
munity of interest” needs of districts outside Yellowknife. Indigenous
interveners, meanwhile, presented a non-universal defense. They main-
tained that the existing balance of ethnonational power in the territory
was protected by sections 35 of the constitution and 25 of the Charter,
rights that would be violated by providing additional seats to
Yellowknife. In effect, the interveners argued that Indigenous peoples, as
a consociating “national group,” possessed a non-universal right to a
fixed share of representation in the Northwest Territories government.
Without such a right, they feared their homeland would be swamped and
democratically dominated by “settlers.”
The court disagreed. Ruling in Yellowknife’s favour, it decreed that
the legislature’s apportionment scheme was impermissibly inegalitarian.
It expressed doubt that section 35 provides a guarantee of non-universal
Indigenous representation, and, moreover, questioned whether section 25
in fact trumps individual voting rights. Analyzed through the lens of
liberal theory, the court in effect ruled that “second order” egalitarianism
(requiring that districts be of relatively equal size) trumps “first order”
non-universalism (requiring that Indigenous rights not be “derogated
from”). Unsurprisingly, the ruling was controversial. It precipitated a “con-
stitutional crisis” in the Northwest Territories (Northwest Territories,
1999a: 66), with the territory’s umbrella First Nations organization
calling for Ottawa to dissolve the territorial legislature—a move that
would thwart “settler” takeover. It also ended longstanding efforts to
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devise a territorial constitution that would formally enshrine ethnonational
power sharing (Northwest Territories, 1999b: 4).
At least one legal scholar deemed the Friends interpretation of section
25 “the only possible exception” to the common judicial understanding of
the non-derogation clause (Morse, 2002: 421). Indeed, the Friends interpre-
tation was soon rejected in Campbell v. British Columbia. Handed down by
the British Columbia Supreme Court in 2000, Campbell has been called
Canada’s most significant case involving Indigenous peoples and section
3 (Morse, 2002: 394). In it, applicants accused the Nisga’a First Nation
self-government agreement of abridging charter-protected voting rights of
non-Nisga’a. The court affirmed that this was true—but, in effect, it held
that such “second-order” abridgement was protected under the “first-
order” non-derogation guarantees of section 25 (Isaac, 2002: 444).
While Campbell involved Indigenous self-rule rather than shared rule,
the decision suggests that, if guaranteed Indigenous representation is indeed
a right under section 35, the “first order” shield of section 25 should protect
that right from charges of epiphenomenal section 3 inegalitarianism. This
view presents a challenge to much of the scholarly and legal discourse on
guaranteed Indigenous representation. Again, as Schouls (1996) has
observed, attempts to apportion polity-based representation to Indigenous
peoples have foundered due to incompatibility with egalitarian representa-
tional requirements. Arguably, the “second order” cart has been placed
before the “first order” horse. Ladner discerned this perverse circumstance
when she noted that most “studies have focused on integrating Aboriginal
representation within the existing electoral scheme.… If they had examined
guaranteed representation as a pre-existing right… they might have arrived
at different, more consistent conclusions” (1997: 86).
Adjudication of FMC representation
Charter cases have also arisen concerning non-universal representation
rights of francophones. The first case, Raîche v. Canada, was a 2004 chal-
lenge in which FMC voters in New Brunswick protested a federal appor-
tionment plan that, to increase parity, transferred them from a
francophone-majority district to an anglophone one. The Federal Court of
Canada agreed, determining that the boundaries commission had erred in
two respects. First, the commission violated the Electoral Boundaries
Readjustment Act by placing too much importance on parity and too little
on preserving “communities of interest.” Second, it violated the Official
Languages Act, which requires that the federal government “enhanc[e]
the vitality of the English and French linguistic minority communities.”
In discussing both errors, the court called the aggrieved francophones a
“community of interest.” It is not clear this description fits. Again, in appor-
tionment, a “community of interest” comprises voters who share politically
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salient interests, aggregated to provide each voter with a voice. Yet the pro-
tection of francophone representation under the Official Languages Act does
not operate in this manner. The protection attaches not to individuals but
group—and not just any groups, but exclusively to two “national groups.”
Similarly, much of the scholarly discussion surrounding Raîche has
focused on whether boundary commissions must accord greater import to
preserving “communities of interest” (Pal, 2015: 253). While this may be
so, insufficient attention has been paid to Raîche’s “first order” implications.
In Raîche, theOfficial Languages Act provided New Brunswick FMCs with a
similar sort of consociational protection that, in Campbell, section 25 pro-
vided to the Nisga’a: a shield, buffering “national groups” from charges of
individual voting-rights abuse. Raîche in part succeeded because FMCs are
not a run-of-the-mill “community of interest” whose aggregation and over-
representation merely facilitate “effective representation” (per Carter), but
rather are a distinct polity whose right to representation flows from, and is
guarded by, Canada’s antecedent non-universalism.
Since Raîche, two more court cases have explored alleged violations of
FMC representational rights. L’Association francophone des municipalités
du Nouveau Brunswick et al. v. New Brunswick challenged a 2013 New
Brunswick provincial redistricting map that increased formal parity by sub-
merging several FMCs into anglo districts. The plaintiffs claimed the plan
breached multiple charter provisions, including section 3 (“effective repre-
sentation”) and section 16.1, requiring that New Brunswick promote the
equal “status, rights and privileges” of anglo and francophone communities
(New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench, 2014: 5). The suit was settled
out of court, with the province amending its apportionment legislation.
Henceforth, New Brunswick boundaries commissions “shall consider the
effective representation of the English and French linguistic communities
in complying with section 3” (New Brunswick, 2014). In the case of
other “communities of interest,” meanwhile, commissions merely “may”
depart from voter parity. Arguably, then, the province has singled out offi-
cial-language minorities as deserving particular attention when balancing
“second order” values of parity versus “community of interest.” Yet it
remains unclear whether francophones, qua polity, are recognized as
bearing “first order” rights.
The most recent case, decided in January 2017, was Reference re the
Final Report of the Electoral Boundaries Commission, arising from Nova
Scotia’s 2012 provincial reapportionment. There, the legislature had
tasked the boundaries commission with insuring that no district exceeded
parity beyond +/−25 per cent. This constraint compelled the commission
to erase all three of the province’s significantly overrepresented FMC “pro-
tected seats,” which had existed for 20 years. The Nova Scotia attorney
general submitted a reference to the provincial court of appeals inquiring
about the constitutionality of the new map. Nova Scotia’s francophone
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association intervened, blasting the province for treating French speakers as
no different from other communities of interest. The interveners suggested
section 3 of the Charter must be interpreted in the context of other charter
provisions, such as sections 16 through 23, protecting official-language
minority communities.
In its ruling, the court held that the province had indeed breached
section 3, but for reasons related to process, not content. The court main-
tained that the constraint placed on the boundaries commission had pre-
vented it from weighing parity against other constitutional requirements,
including providing effective representation to “communities of interest.”
Having condemned this process, the court did not bother to assess the con-
stitutionality of the resulting map. It thus did not explore whether the new
boundaries violated the rights of FMCs, either as a run-of-the-mill “commu-
nity of interest” or as a non-universal polity.
It can thus be seen that, since Raîche, francophones have demanded
protection of their representation on the grounds that FMCs bear polity-
based rights as a “national group.” It can also be seen that courts and leg-
islators have not acknowledged or fully responded to these appeals,
instead conceiving of FMCs as a “community of interest” that at best is
owed distinctive “second order” attention. It therefore appears that, in the
eyes of the court, the rights of FMCs may diverge in degree, though not
in kind, from those of non-”national groups.”
Conclusion
In this article, I do not attempt to say whether, or precisely how, “national
groups” in Canada should be issued consociational representation. I merely
seek to lay out a clear framework for thinking about and adjudicating this
topical, complex, poorly theorized dilemma. I have shown that conflicts
involving consociational apportionment and liberal rights can be usefully
analyzed in relation to the foundational liberal principles of individualism,
egalitarianism and universalism. While apportionment dilemmas involving
the former two principles present what may be called “second order” chal-
lenges, dilemmas related to universalism should logically be resolved first,
as such issues are “constitutionally prior.” This poses a particular challenge
when “first order” claims are emergent. Such cases require reconciling the
freshly asserted rights of “national groups” with the established rights of
individuals. As providing space for the former requires jostling the latter,
such reconciliation will inevitably be controversial. Boundary-makers, leg-
islators and jurists should recognize, however, that while in consociational
democracies non-universal apportionment may produce electoral maps that
are epiphenomenally group-conscious and inegalitarian, such consequences
are distinct from cases involving rights abuses in a unitary polity. Decision
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makers should be cautious of approaching such cases solely from an indi-
vidual-rights perspective.
As I have further shown, it is not clear that, in Canada, this warning has
been heeded. In the case of Indigenous peoples, non-universal guarantees of
self-rule have been confirmed to exist within section 35 of the Constitution
Act, 1982 and to be buffered or even shielded by the Charter’s section 25
non-derogation clause. However, the stepwise logic of Campbell, which
dismissed claims of section 3 inegalitarianism in cases of Indigenous
self-rule, has so far not been extended to discourse on Indigenous shared
rule. I suggest that this may be procedurally illogical, placing decisions con-
cerning “second order” egalitarianism ahead of decisions involving “first
order” non-universalism.
As I have further shown, calls for non-universal representation of
FMCs have been largely conflated with egalitarian concerns regarding
“communities of interest.” First-order polity-based rights and second-
order “community of interest” rights are, despite superficial similarities,
theoretically and constitutionally distinct. Recognizing these distinctions,
I suggest, will help scholars, political leaders and jurists grapple with appor-
tionment demands of emergent polities.
I would finally echo a caution issued by Pildes: “Democratic institu-
tions and processes have constantly been revised … as changing contexts
have generated demands to make democracy more responsive, more legit-
imate or better adapted to new circumstances. Yet as courts find more
aspects of politics to be matters of constitutional law, they risk inappropri-
ately curtailing this process of self-revision” (2004: 48). If decision makers
wish to resolve emergent appeals for power sharing by national groups, they
need to think about those appeals clearly and address them squarely. To
dismiss or side-step such appeals for failing to fit neatly into existing con-
ceptions of purely individual rights will ultimately erode the legitimacy of
governance in multinational states like Canada.
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Colonizing the demos? Settler rights, Indigenous sovereignty,
and the contested ‘structure of governance’ in Canada’s North
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ABSTRACT
Settler-colonialism can consist of a struggle over the pre-political
‘structure of governance’ – over who composes the demos and how
decisions should be made. This article examines two lawsuits where
settlers contested the Indigenous structure of governance in Canada’s
Northwest Territories. I show that in both cases settlers brandished a
novel ‘tool of elimination,’ individual rights to voting, mobility and
expression. I trace how settlers used this tool in a strategic two-
pronged way, challenging as ‘illiberal’ restrictive laws flowing from
Indigenous sovereignty and then championing race-neutral laws the
promulgation of which would open the demos to settler domination.
I show that courts adjudicating these challenges were compelled to
grapple with the appropriate ‘framing of justice’ – with whether
the relevant rights-bearer was the universal individual or the
‘constitutionally prior’ Indigenous demos. I conclude that, where
the court decided on individual-rights grounds, settlers were able







The March 1958 edition ofMADmagazine featured a comic depicting the Lone Ranger and
Tonto surrounded by apparently hostile Native Americans.1 The Lone Ranger exclaimed,
‘Indians! Indians, all around us! Well, Tonto… it looks like we’re finished!’ To which
Tonto replied ‘What do you mean…we?’
The joke became well known. Some see it as racist, framing Indigenous people such as
Tonto (‘fool,’ in Spanish) as traitors or cowards. Others see it as subversive, celebrating a
subaltern who turns the tables on his clueless white boss. I suggest it be considered in
a third way, as an interrogation into the unstable ‘structure of governance’ on settler-colo-
nial frontiers. What do settlers mean by ‘we’? Who, if anyone, is ‘them’? Can ‘we’ absorb
‘them,’ as the Lone Ranger seeks to do? Can ‘they’ resist, as Tonto does?
‘Structure of governance’ questions may seem esoteric. Yet the answers they generate
are the foundation that political regimes are built on. Beneath all our systems of authority –
our customs services, deeds-and-titles offices, election commissions, war councils – are
fragile claims about who ‘we’ are and how and where we should rule. Which is why,
when those claims become contested, regimes may come tumbling down.
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That is one way, albeit unusual, to think about settler colonialism – the conversion of
native domains into New Frances, New Englands, New Zealands and so forth. Though
the tools employed by settlers are diverse, encompassing treaties, Bibles, boarding
schools and Gatling guns, their goal is simple: to make ‘theirs’ ours. One way of doing
that is by revising the pre-colonial ‘structure of governance,’ to make ‘them’ us.
Like other settler states, Canada has experienced such a revision. By the First World War,
Indigenous peoples had largely been swallowed into the Canadian body politic. The Métis
were pacified, First Nations were subjects of the Indian Act, and treaties had converted tra-
ditional Indigenous territories into domestic jurisdictions.2 Yet a sort of frontier remained,
roughly coinciding with the vast, unincorporated Northwest Territories (NWT). There, for
much of the past half century, Indigenous peoples and a booming settler population jock-
eyed for control, striving to shape government in their own image. They battled, in part,
over the NWT’s structure of governance – over who composes the demos and how
decisions should be made. Settlers, with numbers on their side, sought to frame the struc-
ture of governance as universally inclusive. Indigenous peoples resisted: ‘What do you
mean…we?’
I suggest that, by examining this conflict, certain modern settler-colonial dynamics may
be revealed. I break these dynamics into four strands.
First, I suggest that settlers, to reshape the NWT’s ‘structure of governance,’ have brand-
ished a novel ‘tool of elimination’: individual rights to voting, mobility and expression. This
tool has received little attention, save from scholars like Rohrer.3 Building on her work, I
secondly suggest that settlers employed such rights in a specific, strategic, two-pronged
way, condemning as ‘illiberal’ those voting, mobility and expression laws that flow from
Indigenous sovereignty and then swapping in ostensibly race-neutral laws that in effect
would enthrone settlers. Third, building on the ‘structure of governance’ scholarship of
the likes of Issacharoff4 and Pildes,5 and on Fraser’s6 theory of ‘abnormal justice,’ I
suggest that how these rights-cases were resolved hinged on how they were framed –
on whether courts saw the appropriate subject of justice as the universal individual or
the ‘constitutionally prior’ demos. Finally, I show that, where the court ruled on individ-
ual-rights grounds, settlers extended control over the ‘structure of governance,’ thereby
‘colonizing the demos.’
To explore these dynamics, I proceed thusly. In section two I lay out a theory of settler-
colonial challenges to pre-colonial ‘structures of democracy.’ In section three I introduce
the fraught political history of the NWT. In section four, I examine two controversial law-
suits, Allman et al. v Commissioner of the Northwest Territories (1983) and Friends of Democ-
racy v. Northwest Territories (Commissioner) (1999), in which settlers in the NWT charged
that their rights to voting, mobility and expression were violated by Indigenous-domi-
nated decisions concerning the structure of governance. In section five, I analyze those
cases against the backdrop of the aforementioned theory, and then conclude.
Theory
The structure of governance
Democracy is conventionally understood as ‘rule by the people.’ But who are the people,
and how should they rule? Paradoxically, these puzzles cannot be solved democratically.
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The first is political theory’s infamous ‘boundary problem,’ well stated by Jennings: ‘The
people cannot decide until someone decides who are the people.’7 The second puzzle
is no easier – the people cannot decide until someone decides by what rules decisions
should be made.
Issacharoff characterizes these as first-order decisions, foundational and thus ‘constitu-
tionally prior’ to democracy.8 Ideally, such decisions are fixed before a government is up
and running. In the classic American case, the federal demoi were identified, and their
shares of power allotted, during the framing of the Constitution. The Great Compromise
was just that – a ‘structure of governance’ deal, hammered out between the big and
small states, so everyone could get on with other business.
What other business? For one, formalizing what I will call second-order political arrange-
ments, which address how power is to be exercised once governance is underway.
Second-order matters include rules and rights that fall under what is sometimes termed
‘the law of democracy’9 – the guidelines of the democratic process. These guidelines
govern everything from campaign funding to durational-residency requirements to elec-
toral districting. Unlike first-order arrangements, second-order laws of democracy attach
to individuals, not demoi. Rather than enshrining collective self-determination, they
guard difference-blind and egalitarian liberal principles.
Yet as American federalism makes clear, first-order decisions complexly entwine with
second-order ones. Take the aforementioned Great Compromise. Because of it, California,
the most populous state, and Wyoming, the least, enjoy equal representation in the U.S.
Senate. Though this is a first-order arrangement, it has staggering consequences ‘down-
stream,’ for the second-order law of democracy. There, the federal voting power of individ-
ual Californians is a fraction that of Wyomingites. Normally this would be untenable,
transgressing ‘one person, one vote.’ However, since the Great Compromise is constitu-
tionally entrenched, Californians have no legal recourse. The flow of consequences
cannot be reversed to wash upstream.
But elsewhere this may not be the case. Demotic boundaries are not always drawn,
much less enshrined, pre-politically. First-order conflicts may burst into the arena of every-
day politics when there develops a fervent demand to re-level the foundations of govern-
ance.10 Around the world, constitutionally prior questions are emerging with increasing
frequency, taking diverse forms. What is to be done when a faction locks up power via ger-
rymandering? How should shares of power be distributed among consociating polities?
Should annexed peoples retain a measure of sovereignty, or be merged into the
broader state demos? May a restive group break away?
With democracy incapable of answering these dilemmas, courts are increasingly step-
ping in.11 Pildes calls this the ‘constitutionalization of democratic politics.’12 Hirschl counts
it part of the ‘judicialization of mega-politics.’13 Fraser would place it in the burgeoning
field of ‘abnormal justice.’14 Famous first-order cases include the European Court of
Human Rights’ decisions on the legality of power sharing in Belgium15 and Bosnia,16 the
German Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling on joining the Maastricht Treaty,17 the
Supreme Court of Canada’s Quebec Secession Reference,18 and the U.S. Supreme Court’s
revolutionary redistricting decisions, such as Reynolds v. Sims.19
All first-order cases are difficult. They revisit potentially fraught bargains that were
struck, or awkward realities that were sidestepped, at the time of state-making. (Rhetori-
cally, Tierney suggests, ‘why not let sleeping dogs lie rather than invite a confrontation
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over inclusion and exclusion.’20) Too, where first-order questions are emergent, they
cannot be tackled in the vacuum of a constitutional convention. They must be grappled
with in medias res, with demoi already dug in, powers divvied up, and turf jealously
guarded.21
Even more vexingly, first-order cases can be hard to distinguish, or disentangle,
from second-order cases. Individual plaintiffs may protest ethnic discrimination that
ensues from an upstream consociational compromise, as in the aforementioned
Bosnian Sejdić and Finci case. Or, they may allege that their voting power is unfairly
diluted as a consequence of a first-order power-sharing agreement, as in the German
Maastricht case. In such cases, courts may find themselves unmoored. As Fraser notes,
‘normal justice’ is simply about balancing the scale: a bit left, a tad right, and equilibrium
is achieved. But in ‘abnormal’ conditions, where pre-political assumptions are in dispute,
Fraser suggests judges must take a step back and begin with first-order questions.
What is the appropriate scale to use? Who is the rightful subject of justice? How should
justice be framed?
Though seemingly abstract, these questions are elemental. This is because, in abnormal
justice, the frame often foreordains the result. Take the aforementioned Reynolds case.
There, the plaintiff charged that apportioning Alabama state senate seats equally by
county diluted his voting power, violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution’s
Fourteenth Amendment. Alabama countered with the ‘federal analogy’: The U.S. Senate
apportions equally by state, so why can’t we apportion equally by county? Chief Justice
Warren deemed this analogy ‘inapposite,’ writing, ‘Political subdivisions of states – coun-
ties, cities, or whatever – never were and never have been considered as sovereign enti-
ties.’22 In effect, he denied that Alabama’s political subdivisions bear first-order demotic
rights. The sole legitimate subject of justice was deemed to be the plaintiff, owed ‘one
person, one vote.’ As history shows, this finding flowed upstream. The first-order structure
of governance of almost every state was radically amended.
It can be seen, then, that demotic bounding complexly interlinks with everyday demo-
cratic rules. Hence, scholars have urged judges to enter this realm with caution.23 Issa-
charoff warns of the danger of overlooking first-order implications: ‘[C]ourts should be
wary of following their impulses to treat such… conflicts about the structure of political
systems as familiar claims of individual rights.’24 Fraser fears the opposite, that the founda-
tional integrity of the state will overshadow second-order pleas for justice. But her solution
is the same: Judges must be cognizant of how justice is framed. To do this, they must adju-
dicate ‘reflexively,’ grappling with what scale of justice to use before trying to level the
balance.25
I suggest there is even greater cause for judicial caution. First-order cases may be stra-
tegically camouflaged as second-order cases. Despite appearances, plaintiffs’ primary
objective may not be to liberalize the law but, quite conversely, to shake up the foun-
dations of governance so their own group comes to dominate. This might occur where
remedying second-order illiberalism would have an upstream effect, undermining pre-pol-
itical first order arrangements, much as occurred in Reynolds. As I will show next, such
caution is especially warranted in cases of settler colonialism.
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Settler-colonialism and the structure of governance
As Wolfe famously observed, settler colonialism is an insidious and especially resilient
variant of conventional colonialism. Impelled by what he terms a ‘logic of elimination,’
settler-colonists kill, expel, confine or assimilate the locals, seize their homelands, and
found ‘a new colonial society on the expropriated land base.’26 He emphasizes that this
is a two-phase process – that ‘settler colonialism destroys to replace,’27 with Native dissol-
ution preceding settler installation. In this manner, Wolfe says, settler-colonialism sup-
plants Indigenous civilizations with new versions of the settler motherland.
Much has been written about how settler states advance colonial projects using the
language of rights.28 For example, Kymlicka, discussing the Global South and Eastern
Europe, observes that states engaged in ‘demographic engineering’ – moving settlers
into restive minority regions – may condemn as illiberal those arrangements that guard
minority autonomy. He thus concludes, ‘where ethnocultural justice is absent, the
rhetoric and practice of human rights may actually worsen the situation.’29 Scholars
such as Hoxie have showed how rhetoric concerning ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ have
been deployed in U.S. Indian policy; perhaps the most notorious reserve-land allotment
law, the Dawes Act, was hailed by government officials as the ‘Indians’ Magna Carta.’30
Similarly, Eisenberg, writing about Canada, notes that the expansion of settler-state
constitutionalism into subaltern jurisdictions may be passed off as liberalization
when in fact it is the opposite – a tool ‘aimed at advancing the collective cultural dom-
inance of the majority.’31
Far less has been said about how settlers, pursuing a ‘logic of elimination,’ have in
recent decades sought to wield rights, moving them from the realm of rhetoric into the
arena of the courts. This article explores that tactic, showing how assertions of settler
rights regarding voting, mobility and expression were employed in an effort to undermine
the first-order foundations of Indigenous governance – to alter the answer to ‘who are the
people and how should they rule?’ Where Indigenous peoples were once sovereign, set-
tlers strived to dissolve that sovereignty, overturning the pre-colonial order, flipping the
demos from ‘them’ to ‘us.’
As Wolfe might predict, settlers may employ voting rights through a two-phase
approach. Rohrer discerned this approach in her analysis of the 2000 U.S. Supreme
Court case Rice v. Cayetano. She observes that the settler plaintiffs in Rice first ‘proble-
matize[d] collective native identity’ and then ‘naturalize[d] white settler subjectivity via
a color-blind ideology.’32 Specifically, settlers first charged that existing laws of democ-
racy violated second-order individual voting rights, conflating those violations with the
epiphenomenal, downstream effects of first-order Indigenous sovereignty. By framing
Indigenous peoples as citizens seeking to illiberally subject fellow citizens to racial dis-
crimination, rather than as a pre-political sovereign exercising self-determination, Indi-
genous polities were toppled from their demotic throne. The second settler move
was to appeal for the law to be reformed so as to treat individuals equally. Such liberal-
ization can have transformative upstream impacts, installing the broader, settler-domi-
nated demos in power.
Hence I suggest that, per the aforementioned warnings, courts should be cautious of
(mis)framing settler constitutional challenges as second-order appeals to liberal fairness.
Rather, such challenges may be more coherently understood as camouflaged attacks on
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Indigenous structures of governance, with settlers deploying rights not to liberalize but to
dominate – to ‘colonize the demos.’
To examine the above strategy, I turn now to Canada’s NWT, where settler/Indigenous
relations have long been fraught.
The Northwest Territories
One of Canada’s 13 federal subunits, the NWT sprawls across 1.35 million square kilo-
mteres of Arctic and Subarctic terrain. For milennia it was an exclusively Indigenous home-
land.33 Even after settlers overwhelmed the rest of North America, the NWT remained a
place apart. Before the First World War the settler population of the NWT was negligible.34
Canada administered the territory remotely from Ottawa, at times treating it as an Indigen-
ous reserve, vast stretches of which were effectively off limits to non-Natives.35 Significant
settlement commenced only after the Second World War, and was mostly limited to the
mining town of Yellowknife. In 1967 the federal government began devolving authority
to the NWT, with Yellowknife becoming the capital.
Today Indigenous people predominate in rural areas of the NWT while settlers fill Yel-
lowknife. The two groups are almost precisely equipopulous.36 Not all ethnoculturally
plural jurisdictions are ‘divided,’ yet as Choudhry notes, where lines between groups are
stark, pluralism can have immoderating effects on political behavior.37 Such is true in
the NWT. In the 1970s, as Indigenous peoples began to mobilize politically,38 and as Yel-
lowknife swelled with settlers, the NWT became one of the last frontiers of full-blown
settler/Indigenous conflict in North America.39
Initially, settlers enjoyed the upper hand. With influence in Ottawa, and control of the
territorial government,40 they strived to shape the NWT into a standard Anglo-Canadian
province. Jull, writing in 1978, observed that
[t]he white people are very conscious of the fact that they’re building a new society, but it isn’t
new in any qualitative way.… For them there is no interest in new forms of organization but
rather getting the proven Canadian ones, pronto, and dominating them.41
Indigenous leaders condemned the settler government as ‘transitional and illegiti-
mate.’42 Key Indigenous groups boycotted it.43 Indigenous leaders instead pressed
for self-determination,44 insisting territorial governance be overhauled. Inuit lobbied
for a territory of their own, to be called Nunavut. The remaining Indigenous population
floated proposals such as forming a ‘province-like’ jurisdiction called ‘Denendeh,’45
which would feature a fully Indigenous senate armed with veto power, and where
voters would have to meet a 10-year residency requirement,46 disenfranchizing most
settlers. The NWT government decried such proposals as ‘abhorrent.’47 The federal gov-
ernment agreed, stating, ‘there is no place in Canada for governments based on race
or ethnicity.’48
In 1981, however, NWT voters elected an Indigenous-dominated government.49 It
embraced Indigenous land claims, including the aforementioned Nunavut proposal,
which came into being in 1999. As well, it made a habit of apportioning assembly seats
such that rural Indigenous districts enjoyed substantial overrepresentation vis-à-vis
settler-dominated Yellowknife.50 Hence, despite growing settler numbers, assembly
members were disproportionately Indigenous throughout the 1980s and ‘90s.
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Scholars followed these developments with intrigue. They termed the NWT ‘the most
distinctive society within Canada’51 and ‘a laboratory for students of political represen-
tation.’52 Jull called the conflict in the NWT ‘[n]ot healthy dissent to be resolved by the
ballot box, but [a] fundamental dispute about whose country it is and what the ground
rules are.’53 Dacks observed that
of all jurisdictions in Canada, only in the NWT does the question still remain open as to which
political philosophy – liberalism based on the individual, nationalism based on ethnic identity,
or consociationalism which attempts to integrate the two – will ultimately guide the political
process.54
At first, the NWT’s settler/Indigenous conflict was fought mostly through appeals to public
opinion, petitioning federal officials, and territorial electoral politics. In 1982, new weapons
became available. Canada, which to that point had lacked a substantive bill of rights or
active judicial review, adopted the Constitution Act, 1982 and the associated Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.
Those documents, for the first time, entrenched Indigenous rights. Section 35 of the
constitution affirmed certain Indigenous ‘existing rights,’ which (as will be discussed
below) were in time deemed to include the ‘inherent right of self-government.’ Mean-
while, section 25 of the Charter, often called the ‘non-derogation clause,’ anticipated
clashes between individual and Indigenous rights, buffering – perhaps even blocking –
diminution of the latter.55
Yet the Charter also spelled out rights owed to all Canadians, including settlers. Section
2 protects ‘fundamental freedoms,’ including freedom of expression. Section 3 guarantees
that ‘Every citizen has a right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons
or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein.’ Section 6
enshrines the right ‘to move to and take up residence in any province.’
As I will now show, almost immediately, settlers took up these rights to challenge the
Indigenous-controlled NWT government.
The cases
Allman et al. v the commissioner of the Northwest Territories
Allman was heard by the NWT Supreme Court in January 1983. Margaret Louise Allman
and 10 other applicants charged that the territory’s new Plebiscite Ordinance violated
their Charter-protected rights. The ordinance had been enacted in preparation for an
April 1982 plebiscite on whether to divide the territory to form the new Inuit-majority ter-
ritory of Nunavut. Though the plebiscite was legally non-binding, the territorial govern-
ment had vowed to respect its outcome. Unlike in territorial elections, where citizens
qualified to vote after just one year of residency, the new ordinance limited voting in ple-
biscites to residents of three years or more. The applicants, all of whom had lived in the
NWT between one and three years, met the regular-election criterion but were ineligible
to vote in the plebiscite.
Legislative-assembly records and media and scholarly discussions make clear that the
plebiscite was polarized along settler/Indigenous lines. In crafting the plebiscite bill, some
Indigenous assembly members championed a residency requirement of at least 10 years,
‘to have these long-term decisions made by the native people.’56 In turn, they decried their
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most vocal opponent, a settler member representing Yellowknife, as ‘the number one
enemy of the people of the North.’57 Of course, the vast majority of residents disqualified
by the three-year requirement were settlers. Abele and Dickerson note the plebiscite was
‘part of an overall Native strategy to shape novel… governing institutions for the North-
west Territories.’58 Settlers largely opposed that strategy. Unsurprisingly, the plebiscite’s
results were split by race, with nine of the NWT’s 10 majority-settler communities opposing
division and 17 of the 24 majority-Indigenous communities supporting it.59 Overall, the
pro-division vote was 56 percent. It can be assumed that, had the plebiscite ordinance
not barred newly arrived settlers, the result would have been closer.
Significantly, Allman and the other applicants did not challenge the validity of the ple-
biscite itself, which had been held three days before the Charter came into effect. Rather,
they challenged the enabling ordinance, claiming it abridged their section 2 right to
freedom of expression or, alternately, their section 6 right to freedom of mobility. They
further argued that these abridgements were not ‘saved’ by the Charter’s section 1 ‘limit-
ations clause,’ as the three-year requirement was abnormally long – six times the Canadian
average – and so fell outside ‘reasonable limits… demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society.’ They maintained that, even if the plebiscite’s results could not be ret-
roactively invalidated, the law should be amended as ‘there is a reasonable expectation
that the ordinance will be used again.’60
The respondent, the government of the NWT, disagreed. It argued that the three-year
requirement was justified given the exceptional circumstances of the NWT. It wrote:
the Canadian North faces problems which are unique in Canada.… People come from the
south part of Canada and work or live in the Territories for a year or two or three and then
return south again. It is not surprising nor is it unreasonable that the Legislative Assembly
of the Northwest Territories should wish a means to find out the views of the long-term resi-
dents of the Northwest Territories. They are the people who will be most affected by decisions
of a long-term nature.61
In January 1983, NWT Supreme Court Justice Mark de Weerdt issued his ruling, finding in
favor of the Indigenous-controlled government.62 He ruled largely on technical grounds.
Per the text of the Charter, he wrote, section 3 voting rights cover elections, not plebiscites.
This, he surmised, was why the applicants had hung their case on section 2, freedom of
expression. But he found freedom of expression relates to speech and the press, not
voting. Likewise, de Weerdt ruled that section 6, concerning freedom of mobility, was irre-
levant –despite the plebiscite ordinance, the applicants had successfully takenup residence
in the NWT. Finding no Charter violations, de Weerdt made no comment on whether limit-
ing voting to ‘long-term residents,’ rather than people ‘from the south part of Canada,’was a
constitutional government objective. The plebiscite ordinance was allowed to stand.
Friends of democracy v. Northwest Territories (commissioner)
Friends was heard in the NWT Supreme Court in January 1999. A group of residents of
settler-dominated Yellowknife, including the city’s mayor, charged that the territory’s
latest electoral-districting map violated their Charter voting rights. As with the 1982 ple-
biscite, the run-up to the 1998 redistricting had been racially charged. A series of legal
and demographic developments had converged to make the redistricting exercise a
crucial battle in the NWT’s long-running Indigenous/settler power struggle.
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The first development favored Indigenous interests. In 1995, the federal Liberal govern-
ment had issued the ‘Inherent Right Policy,’ proposing ways to implement section 35 Indi-
genous self-government rights. One avenue, which it deemed especially applicable to the
NWT, was through ‘specific guarantees within public government institutions.’63 In the
NWT there followed a flurry of high-level efforts to forge a new constitution establishing
Indigenous/settler power-sharing. While many settlers were deeply opposed to this idea,
compromise seemed inevitable. ‘A balance will be struck between these contending
forces,’ Dacks predicted. ‘The question is where exactly the balance will lie on the axis
between self-government and public government.’64
The second development favored settlers. Following adoption of the Charter, the
specter of a voting-rights challenge loomed over the NWT’s malapportioned electoral
map. In 1983, during the first post-Charter redistricting, the NWT’s electoral-boundaries
commission split over whether to bolster representation in Yellowknife, with the two Indi-
genous commissioners opposed and the sole settler commissioner insisting that the prin-
ciple of representation by population ‘cannot be ignored.’65 In the next redistricting, in
1989, the entire electoral-boundaries commission recommended a new seat for Yellow-
knife. Some Yellowknife assembly members insisted the Charter required at least two
new seats.66 Under constitutional pressure, the assembly approved the commission’s pro-
posed new map. In White’s analysis of the 1989 apportionment, he noted that,
unprecedentedly,
the Charter forced the commission to concentrate on the equality of individual voters.… [T]o
the extent that northern political distinctiveness is more than an exotic curiosity, but rep-
resents a political response to the unique political problems of the North, this is not a positive
development.67
With the two above developments placing Indigenous self-determination and individual
voting rights in tension, the third development ratcheted the tension higher. The
eastern half of the NWT was set to become Nunavut in 1999. The demographics of the
remaining, western NWT would thus transform, from a decisive Indigenous majority to
an even split between Indigenous residents and settlers. For settlers, this would represent
a dramatic gain; it would, noted Dacks, give them little incentive ‘to support a consti-
tutional innovation that would undermine the majoritarian principle.’68 The opposite
would be true for Indigenous people. Without entrenching Indigenous self-government,
the post-division demographic situation would open them to domination by settlers.
In June 1998, a boundaries commission was empaneled to redraw the NWT electoral
map in preparation for Nunavut’s departure. Both settler and Indigenous actors knew
their political future hinged on how many seats would be assigned to their respective fac-
tions. That decision, in turn, hinged on the rules of electoral-boundary making. The com-
mission conducted hearings, in which Indigenous communities expressed ‘substantial
concern… about being “overwhelmed” by Yellowknife.’69 In settler-dominated Yellow-
knife, meanwhile, ‘the majority…wanted to see the electoral districts changed to
reflect the principle of “representation by population.”’70 The commission called for two
more seats in Yellowknife. In November 1998, in an explosive session of the legislative
assembly, Yellowknife and Indigenous legislators dueled over the competing values of
electoral parity and Indigenous self-determination. The commission’s recommendation
was voted down and the status quo preserved. Yellowknife, home to 44 percent of the
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territory’s residents, was left with 29 percent of assembly seats. Two Yellowknife districts
dramatically exceeded Canada’s generally accepted constitutional limit of 25 percent var-
iance above parity. One district, Yellowknife South, exceeded parity by 152 percent. The
next day, the Friends lawsuit was announced.
The applicants, in presenting their case to the court, claimed the underrepresentation
of Yellowknife districts denied them ‘effective representation’ – the electoral-districting
standard established by Justice Beverley McLachlin in the Supreme Court of Canada’s con-
trolling Carter case. The applicants further argued that such underrepresentation was not
redeemed by the territory’s distinctive ‘historical and social context,’ nor by difficulties pro-
viding ‘ombudsperson’ representation to rural and isolated electoral districts. The NWT,
they stated, ‘is not so different that fundamental democratic principles do not apply.’71
The applicants finally challenged the objection that adding Yellowknife seats would
upset the territory’s ethnonational ‘balance of power.’ This view, they argued, ‘represent[s]
a fundamental misapprehension of the right to vote under section 3. The section 3
right is an individual right,’72 not a right owed to ethnonational collectivities.
The respondents, the Indigenous-dominated NWT government, defended the
impugned boundary map. They too quoted Justice McLachlin – not from Carter, but
from Dixon, a case she had decided while head of the British Columbia Supreme Court.
There, McLachlin had ruled that ‘departure from the ideal of absolute equality may not
constitute breach of section 3 of the Charter so long as the departure can be objectively
justified as contributing to better government of the populace as a whole.’73 In the NWT,
the respondents argued, the goal of ‘better government’ had always trumped strict voter
parity. Since the territory’s first apportionment, territorial leaders had ‘accepted that Yel-
lowknife would be underrepresented in favor of the smaller communities with Aboriginal
majorities.’74 This arrangement compensated for rural disadvantages related to ‘ombud-
sperson’ service, provided effective representation to small but culturally distinct ‘commu-
nities of interest,’ and facilitated tacit power-sharing between the territory’s discrete
cultures. The respondents closed by stating that the NWT ‘is unique and deserving of a
northern solution which… could be the envy of any jurisdiction with a significant Abori-
ginal population.’75
A submission to the court was also made by intervening parties representing the NWT’s
key Indigenous organizations. They grounded their case explicitly in Indigenous rights.76
Providing Yellowknife with more assembly seats, they maintained, would impede
ongoing efforts to negotiate and implement the ‘inherent right’ of Indigenous self-govern-
ment, protected under the constitution’s section 35. Thus, they said, even if the territory’s
electoral map contravened section 3 voting rights, this contravention was shielded by the
Charter’s section 25, the Indigenous ‘non-derogation’ clause, which buffers Indigenous
rights when they conflict with other Charter provisions.
The Friends decision, handed down in March 1999, was, like Allman, penned by Justice
de Weerdt. He stated that the question before the court was ‘whether the underrepresen-
tation of voters at Yellowknife… is in violation of section 3 of the Charter.’77 He ruled it
was. Addressing the government’s submission, he agreed that, given the NWT’s distinctive
geographical features, ‘ombudsperson’ representation was doubtlessly difficult in isolated
rural districts. Hence, he said, many of those districts had been apportioned fewer constitu-
ents than the territorial average. Having done so, why additionally impair urban electors by
making their districts exceptionally large? The more justifiable solution, he argued, would
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be to expand the legislature, preserving small districts while giving new seats to
Yellowknife.78
De Weerdt next addressed ‘balance of power.’ While careful not to concede that this
issue was germane to the case, he suggested that, regardless, it was moot. Providing Yel-
lowknife with two more seats, as the boundaries commission had recommended, would
still leave the city’s legislative share at just six of 16, a clear minority.79 He took a similarly
dim view of arguments concerning Indigenous rights. The section 35 rights the intervenors
claimed were threatened, he declared, were at best ‘process rights,’ relating to ‘nego-
tiations over the future self-government of Aboriginal or other groups which might yet
take decades to bring to a conclusion.’80 Further, given the central role of voting in democ-
racy, he questioned whether Indigenous rights could ever trump voting rights: ‘[N]either
the existence nor the due exercise of that right should depend on the leave… of any gov-
ernment or executive authority, be it in relation to the negotiation or enjoyment of any
Aboriginal land claim or other Aboriginal treaty right.’81 De Weerdt ordered the electoral
map be redrawn.
Analysis and conclusion
I contend that these two legal battles in Canada’s NWT – Allman v. Northwest Territories and
Friends of Democracy v. Northwest Territories – showcase a web of modern settler-colonial
strategies deployed in an effort to colonize Indigenous ‘structures of democracy.’ From this
web, at least four distinct strands may be teased out.
First, Allman and Friends both highlight the use of a novel and understudied settler
‘tool of elimination’: individual rights. In Allman, the settler plaintiffs charged that the
NWT’s plebiscite ordinance infringed their individual rights to free expression and mobi-
lity guaranteed under sections 2 and 6 of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In
Friends, settlers alleged violation of their section 3 voting rights. Free-expression, mobi-
lity and voting are rights of the second-order variety, concerning ‘laws of democracy.’
They attach to individuals, not to first-order polities, and are at first blush unrelated to
the pre-political, ‘structure of governance’ questions ‘who are the people, and how
should they rule?’ Yet settlers have used these rights to challenge Indigenous self-gov-
ernment such as that guaranteed by the constitution’s section 35, as well as to chal-
lenge Indigenous decolonial projects such as the formation of Nunavut and the
entrenchment of consociational power sharing in the NWT. Clearly, in the NWT, individ-
ual rights have been harnessed as a tool of settler-colonialism.
Second, in both Allman and Friends the plaintiffs employed a specific strategy involving
dual moves of destruction and then construction. I suggest this strategy reflects Wolfe’s
assessment that settler-colonialism ‘destroys to replace.’82 Even more precisely, I
suggest these dual moves were presciently discerned by Rohrer, who, in analyzing the
U.S. Supreme Court case Rice v. Cayetano, observed that settler-rights claimants sought
to ‘problematize collective native identity’ and then ‘naturalize white settler subjectivity
via a color-blind ideology.’ Let me try to trace this dynamic.
As noted, the plaintiffs in both Allman and Friends claimed their rights were violated by
NWT laws. The impugned laws were distinctly ‘laws of democracy.’ They were downstream
effects of a pre-political ‘structure of governance,’ designed to treat the NWT’s Indigenous
peoples as a first-order, rights-bearing demos. The NWT government articulated this view
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in its submissions to the courts. In Allman, the government maintained that the impugned
voting restrictions flowed from its desire to poll ‘long term residents’ about ‘an issue of a
long term nature’ – that is, to provide Indigenous residents with decision-making power
over the creation of Nunavut. In so doing, the NWT government, for the purposes of ple-
biscitary voting, framed the demos in a manner predominantly comprising Indigenous
people, exercising self-determination.
In Friends, meanwhile, the government testified that any underrepresentation of Yel-
lowknife voters was merely a downstream consequence of pre-political arrangements
to achieve ‘better government.’ Overweighting the NWT’s Indigenous polity, and thus
promoting inter-polity power sharing in the NWT assembly, was, the government
suggested, ‘a northern solution which… could be the envy of any jurisdiction with a
significant Aboriginal population.’ The Indigenous intervenors were more explicit,
deeming overrepresentation to be a section 35 right owed to the Indigenous demos.
This right was especially relevant in 1999, when the NWT’s proportion of settlers was
about to leap, and when efforts to entrench Indigenous/settler power sharing hung
in the balance.
In both Allman and Friends, the plaintiffs’ legal challenges seemed intended to under-
mine these ‘structures of democracy.’ In this manner, as Rohrer put it, ‘collective native
identity’ would be ‘problematized.’ This may be seen as Wolfe’s initial dimension of
settler colonialism, where Indigenous political selfhood is targeted for destruction.
But of course, in both Allman and Friends, settlers appealed not merely for the
impugned ‘laws of democracy’ to be invalidated, but for them to be liberalized. This
move too might seem an innocuous second-order appeal, to make laws regarding
expression, mobility and voting fair to all. As Rohrer again discerned, such a move
would ‘naturalize white settler subjectivity via a color-blind ideology.’ In Allman, settlers
requested that, in case of another plebiscite, durational-residency requirements be shor-
tened to match those elsewhere in Canada. Likewise, the Friends plaintiffs asked that
the territory’s electoral map be redrawn in a more egalitarian fashion. Both of these
changes would inevitably flow upstream, altering the ‘structure of governance.’ In both
plebiscitary voting and electoral districting, the NWT demos would be recast to consist
of relatively equal, undifferentiated individuals. This would dramatically empower settlers,
whose numbers were booming, providing them with greater control over not only every-
day politics but also over territorial (de)colonization. This may be seen as exemplifying
Wolfe’s constructive dimension of settler colonialism, in which the Indigenous political
self is replaced by that of settlers.
Third, it is evident that the success of this settler strategy hinges, at least in part, on how
justice is framed – on whether courts see the relevant rights-bearers as second-order uni-
versal individuals or as the first-order Indigenous demos.
In the Allman decision, Justice de Weerdt interpreted settler rights narrowly, deeming
no justiciable violation to have occurred. He let the status quo stand, taking no overt pos-
ition on the question ‘who are the people, and how should they rule.’ He thus stayed clear
of the proverbial ‘political thicket,’ in effect evading the first-order question at hand.
But in Friends, de Weerdt deemed that settlers’ section 3 voting rights had been
abridged. He thus faced a dilemma: Was this abridgement indefensible, or was it,
instead, the epiphenomenal, downstream effect of a protected first-order structure? Put
another way, was Indigenous domination in the NWT, like the overweighting of small
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states in the U.S. Senate, constitutionally justified? Or were the NWT’s Indigenous peoples
more like the Alabama counties in Reynolds – pretenders to the throne, who ‘never were
and never have been considered as sovereign entities’? The plaintiffs argued the latter, dis-
puting the notion that voting rights should take into account concerns such as ‘better gov-
ernment’ or the securing of ‘a northern solution.’ That notion, the plaintiffs said, is ‘a
fundamental misapprehension of the right to vote.’
De Weerdt agreed. Apparently seeing Friends in what I have called second-order terms,
he declined to consider whether the impugned section 3 violation was the downstream
effect of a legitimate structure of governance. And, he refused to accept that liberalizing
the law would have unconstitutional upstream effects. To the NWT government he noted
that, despite added representation in Yellowknife, the balance of power in the assembly
might not change. To the Indigenous intervenors he stated that their section 25 and 35
rights could not block such changes. Sharing the settler plaintiffs’ views, he in effect
ruled that, for the purposes of redistricting, the territory’s proper demos was one compris-
ing all residents as relatively undifferentiated individuals.
Fourth and finally, Allman and Friends show that, where settler-colonists strategically
assert indivudal rights to voting, mobility and expression, and where justice is framed
so as to validate that strategy, a conquest of the Indigenous structure of governance
may result. Settlers, able to dissolve the Indigenous ‘them’ into the settler ‘we,’ may
achieve power over Indigenous peoples and lands.
Following the Allman decision, the applicants appealed all the way to the Supreme
Court of Canada. In May 1984 the court denied their application without comment. Mean-
while, the territorial government, as promised, appealed to the federal government to let
Inuit form their own territory. A second plebiscite was held, in 1992, again with a three-
year residency requirement, to establish the precise border between the NWT and
Nunavut. In April 1999, to great fanfare, Nunavut came into being – a widely cited exem-
plar of Indigenous decolonization.
But where Allman paved the way for Nunavut, Friends plunged the NWT into a ‘consti-
tutional crisis.’83 The territorial government, its hands tied by the ruling, added five new
assembly seats, three in Yellowknife and two in mixed settler/Indigenous communities.
The territory’s premier, a longtime Indigenous leader, called the change ‘a bitter pill
and… a shift in power.’84 To forestall that shift, the territory’s leading Indigenous-rights
organization took the remarkable step of imploring the federal government to dissolve
the assembly. (Said the organization’s co-chair, ‘the imbalance we have always feared is
upon us.’85) The federal government declined. After a quarter-century of effort, work on
settler/Indigenous power sharing in the NWT ceased.86 Indigenous groups switched
focus, abandoning collaboration with the territorial government and instead seeking
self-rule through so-called ‘treaty federal’ arrangements. By 2003 the first such self-rule
arrangement was established, providing a standalone ethnic government to the territory’s
most populous Indigenous group, the Tłįcho .
Thereafter, setter/Indigenous conflict in the NWT became more muted. Still, electoral
redistricting remained contested. In the 2006 redistricting, the electoral boundaries com-
mission recommended two new seats, in Yellowknife and a fast-growing Indigenous com-
munity. The assembly rejected this proposal, sticking to the status quo. Yellowknife
members raised the specter of another Charter challenge,87 but none was launched. In
the 2013 redistricting, the assembly again refused appeals for new Yellowknife seats.
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Instead, the assembly adjusted Yellowknife’s seven districts so all were near, but none
above, 25-percent deviation from parity. The City of Yellowknife launched a lawsuit,
rooted largely in procedural arguments. It was easily defeated, with the court ruling
that the redistricting did not impair Yellowknife residents’ ‘effective representation.’
This article has shown that settlers may employ rights-claims as a tool of elimination,
with a transformational goal – to ‘colonize the demos.’ Settler-colonialism can in part
be understood as an effort to flip the existing structure of governance from ‘them’
to ‘us.’ Settlers employ rights to alter the normative and legal answers to the founda-
tional first-order questions ‘who are the people, and how should they rule?’ Pre-
colonially, Indigenous peoples formed the demoi of their homelands, governing
through Indigenous self-determination. Settler-colonialism strives to redefine the
demos as ‘all of us.’ In this new demos, settlers are of course numerically predominant,
and may govern by majority rule. In this way, settlers seek to enact Wolfe’s ‘logic of
elimination,’ displacing Indigenous sovereigns and ‘erect[ing] a new colonial society
on the expropriated land base.’88
This article thus shows Issacharoff is correct that ‘[C]ourts should be wary of following
their impulses to treat… conflicts about the structure of political systems as familiar claims
of individual rights.’89 This is because, to upend the demos, settlers may camouflage first-
order cases as second-order cases. Per Rohrer, they may do this through dual strategic
moves. The first move is to ‘problematize collective native identity’ and the next is to ‘nat-
uralize white settler subjectivity via a color-blind ideology.’90 Put simply, settlers attack as
illiberal those second-order laws that are the epiphenomenal, downstream consequence
of first-order Indigenous sovereignty – durational-residency constraints on settler voting,
underrepresentation of settlers, and so forth. In doing so, settlers frame the Indigenous
governors as a racial group subjecting people of another race to illiberal treatment,
rather than as a pre-political sovereign exercising legitimate national self-determination.
Settlers then demand that the second-order laws be liberalized. If courts do not find
that the first-order structure of Indigenous sovereignty is constitutionally entrenched
and/or otherwise legitimate, then the ensuing liberalization may flow upstream. The
demos may be transformed.
Finally, this article has shown that settler-rights cases may shape the course of Indi-
genous (de)colonization. They did so in Canada’s NWT. Broadly speaking, the court’s
refusal in 1983 to condemn the impugned plebiscite ordinance opened the way for
the creation of Nunavut, a landmark act of Indigenous decolonization. Conversely, set-
tlers’ success in 1999 effectively terminated hopes for territorial Indigenous control or
power sharing; thereafter, Indigenous self-determination was pursued more narrowly.
The NWT demos was, to a greater degree, colonized by settlers. Ongoing settler
legal action has sought, so far unsuccessfully, to extend and entrench this demotic
advantage. How further rights-claims will shape the course of settler-colonialism in
the NWT remains to be seen.
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ABSTRACT
Settler colonialism eliminates Indigenous sovereignty, enthrones
itself, and thereby makes Indigenous land ‘ours’. It may do this
meta-politically, by absorbing ‘them’ into ‘us’. This article explores
three recent lawsuits brought by settlers against Indigenous
demoi in US Pacific territories. I show that in each lawsuit, settlers
brandished a novel ‘tool of elimination’: individual voting rights. I
trace how settlers wielded this tool to deliver a ‘one-two punch’,
first condemning as ‘illiberal’ restrictive voting laws flowing from
Indigenous sovereignty and then championing race-neutral laws
that would in effect enthrone settlers. I show that courts hearing
these cases were faced with choosing the appropriate ‘framing of
justice’ – with whether the relevant rights-bearer was the
universal individual voter or the ‘constitutionally prior’ Indigenous
demos. Finally, I show that, because the courts ultimately framed
these disputes as individual-rights cases, settlers extended control








Because there are many of us, says Jeremy Waldron, there is politics.1 But who is ‘us’? Are
some instead ‘them’? Can the former absorb the latter, and if so, how and when? It is
because of questions like these that there is meta-politics, the focus of this paper. Meta-
political questions may seem esoteric, but that is far from the case. They are elemental,
generating the foundation stones upon which polities are built. Undergirding any self-gov-
erning community are subjective assertions about who ‘we, the people’ are and how and
where ‘we’ should rule. If those meta-political foundations erode – or indeed, if they are
strategically undermined – a polity may be brought to its knees.
That is one way to think about settler colonialism in the United States. Just four cen-
turies ago, what is now the United States was home to an array of self-ruling Indigenous
peoples who presided over territories and citizenries they considered their own. Then
came the tide of Europeans, deposing Indigenes and enthroning themselves. Their tools
were diverse – treaties, Bibles, boarding schools, Gatling guns. But their goal was
simple: make ‘theirs’ ours.
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT Aaron John Spitzer Aaron.Spitzer@uib.no Institute of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen, Bergen,
Norway
POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES
2019, VOL. 22, NO. 2, 131–149
https://doi.org/10.1080/13688790.2019.1591569
By 1890, this meta-political coup was largely complete. The Indian Wars were over, the
frontier was closed, the West was won. Native Americans were wards of the United States,
and Indian Country was a domestic rather than foreign jurisdiction.
Arguably, however, Manifest Destiny did not cease at the western ocean. That same
decade, the United States acquired its first offshore territories in the Pacific. These too
were Indigenous jurisdictions. Some of them, in some sense, remain that way. Hawaii
was of course swallowed into the American body politic, but its Indigenous people,
unlike mainland Native Americans, have an ambiguous constitutional status. Similarly,
colonies like the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) and Guam
are in meta-political limbo. They are not exactly ‘ours’, nor securely ‘theirs’. Insofar as
native sovereignty in, and of, Hawaii, CNMI and Guam is disputed, these places may
be seen as still-active fronts of US settler colonialism.
I suggest that key dynamics of modern settler colonialism may be revealed by examin-
ing settler/Indigenous clashes on these Pacific frontiers. I sort these dynamics into four
strands.
First, I suggest that in the Pacific we can see settlers brandishing a new ‘tool of elimin-
ation’: individual voting rights, asserted in opposition to Indigenous anti-colonial efforts.
Except in the work of scholars like Judy Rohrer,2 this tool has received little attention.
Second, building on her work, I suggest that settlers wielding this tool in effect deliver a
‘one-two punch’, condemning as ‘illiberal’ those voting laws flowing from Indigenous
sovereignty and then swapping them with ostensibly race-neutral laws that serve to
enthrone the settler demos. Third, building on Nancy Fraser’s3 theory of ‘abnormal
justice’, and on the ‘structure of democracy’ work of the likes of Samuel Issacharoff4
and Richard Pildes,5 I suggest that how these rights cases are resolved hinges on how
they are framed – on whether courts see the appropriate subject of justice as the universal
individual or the ‘constitutionally prior’ native demos. Finally, I contend that, where such
disputes are framed as individual-rights cases, settlers may achieve control of frontier
meta-politics. Having problematised the existence of a discrete ‘them’, they may dissolve
Indigenous political selfhood into the broader American ‘we’. In this manner, settler
rights, though asserted under the guise of liberalisation, may thwart Indigenous liberation.
This article seeks to examine these dynamics by analysing three recent lawsuits in the US
Pacific. In all three, settlers charged that their rights were violated as a result of Indigenous
assertions of self-determination. My argument proceeds in the following way. In Section 2 I
lay out a theory of the meta-politics of settler colonialism. In Section 3 I examine the
Hawaiian case Rice v. Cayetano, decided by the US Supreme Court in 2000. In Section 4
I study Davis v. Commonwealth Election Commission, involving CNMI, decided in 2016.
In Section 5 I look at the 2017 case Davis v. Guam. In Section 6 I analyse and conclude.
2. Theory
2.1. Meta-politics and law
Democracy is ‘rule by the people’, but who are the people? This is the meta-political
‘boundary problem’ vexing to theorists of liberalism and democracy. Democracy provides
no solution to the boundary problem; as Ivor Jennings observes, ‘The people cannot decide
until someone decides who are the people’.6 Liberalism is not much more helpful. Most
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liberals support the right of peoples to collective self-determination, yet are troubled by
how self-determination harms outsiders who want in and insiders who want out.
It is no wonder, then, that demos-bounding takes place external to normal politics. The
line between the political ‘self’ and others typically emerges from deep history, or is
dictated by brute realpolitik, or is crystallised in some hallowed ‘constitutional
moment’. Issacharoff7 describes bounding as ‘constitutionally prior’ to democracy; he
thus calls it a ‘first order’ exercise. Ideally, boundaries are fixed before a government is
up and running. In the classic American case, the federal demoi were identified, and
their shares of power allotted, during the framing of the Constitution. The Great Compro-
mise was exactly as it sounds – a meta-political bargain, hashed out between the big and
small states, so everyone could get on with other business.
Other business like what? For one, formalising what could be called ‘second order’ pol-
itical arrangements, dealing with how power is to be exercised once governance is under-
way. Second-order matters include rules and rights that fall under the so-called ‘law of
democracy’8 – the guidelines of the democratic process. These guidelines govern campaign
funding, durational-residency requirements, electoral districting and so forth. Unlike first-
order arrangements, which attach to demoi, second-order laws of democracy attach to
individuals. Rather than enshrining collective self-determination, they protect liberal
values such as difference-blindness and egalitarianism.
Yet meta-political choices complexly entwine with political ones, as is evident from the
case of the aforementioned Great Compromise. Due to it, Wyoming, the state with the
lowest population, and California, with the highest, enjoy equal representation in the
US Senate. This first-order arrangement has staggering consequences ‘downstream’ for
the second-order law of democracy. There, the federal voting power of individual Wyo-
mingites dramatically exceeds that of Californians. Normally this would be unacceptable
– an affront to ‘one person, one vote’. However, because the Great Compromise is consti-
tutionally entrenched, the underrepresented citizens of California have no legal recourse.
Any attempt to correct downstream malapportionment would wash upstream, impermis-
sibly eroding the federal order.
Yet collective self-determination is not always entrenched at the time of state-making –
or it does not always stay entrenched. When there develops a fervent demand to re-level
the foundations of governance, first-order demotic battles may erupt into everyday poli-
tics.9 Such constitutionally prior questions take diverse forms. What is to be done when a
faction employs gerrymandering to achieve a stranglehold on power? How should power
be divvied up among consociating polities? Should annexed peoples be merged into the
broader state demos, or retain a measure of sovereignty? May sovereigntists break away?
As noted, democracy is incapable of answering such first-order dilemmas. Hence,
courts are increasingly stepping in.10 Ran Hirschl calls this the ‘judicialization of mega-
politics’11; Pildes, the ‘constitutionalization of democratic politics’.12 Fraser would
situate it within the field of ‘abnormal justice’.13 Familiar first-order cases include the
European Court of Human Rights’ decisions on the legality of power sharing in
Belgium14 and Bosnia,15 the German Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling on joining
the Maastricht Treaty,16 the Supreme Court of Canada’s Quebec Secession Reference,17
and the US Supreme Court’s revolutionary redistricting decisions, such as Reynolds
v. Sims.18
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All demotic-bounding cases are thorny. They dredge up potentially fraught bargains
that were hammered out, or awkward realities that were dodged, at the time of state-
making. (Rhetorically, Stephen Tierney suggests, ‘why not let sleeping dogs lie rather
than invite a confrontation over inclusion and exclusion’.19) Moreover, where first-
order questions are emergent, they cannot be tackled in the vacuum of a ‘constitutional
moment’. They must be grappled with on the fly, in the hurly-burly of everyday politics,
with demoi who are already dug in, powers divvied up, and turf jealously guarded.20
Even more confoundingly, first-order cases can be hard to distinguish, or disentwine,
from second-order cases. Individuals may contest ethnic discrimination that ensues
from an upstream demotic compromise, as in the aforementioned Bosnian Sejdić and
Finci case. Or, they may allege that their voting power has been watered down by a
first-order power-sharing deal, as in the German Maastricht case. In such cases,
courts may find themselves at sea. ‘Normal justice’, states Fraser, is about balancing
the proverbial scale of justice until equilibrium is achieved. But in ‘abnormal’ con-
ditions, where ‘constitutionally prior’ assumptions are in dispute, she suggests courts
must begin with meta-questions. What is the correct scale to use? How should
justice be framed?
Such questions are fundamental because in abnormal justice the frame may foreordain
the result. The Supreme Court’s aforementioned Reynolds case makes this clear. In that
case, an Alabama resident charged that malapportionment of the state senate diluted
his voting power, violating the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause. The state
responded with the ‘federal analogy’: the US Senate is malapportioned, so why can’t Ala-
bama’s senate be likewise? Chief Justice Warren deemed this analogy ‘inapposite’, writing,
‘Political subdivisions of states – counties, cities, or whatever – never were and never have
been considered as sovereign entities’.21 The court in effect ruled that Alabama’s political
subdivisions lack first-order demotic rights. In Reynolds, the sole legitimate subject of
justice was deemed to be the individual voter, owed ‘one person, one vote’. As history
shows, this finding flooded upstream. The first-order ‘structure of democracy’ of almost
every state legislature was quickly upended.
It can be seen, then, that what is ‘constitutionally prior’ complexly entwines with what
is ‘constitutionally post’ – that the ‘structure of democracy’ and the ‘law of democracy’ are
interlinked in an upstream/downstream dynamic. Hence, scholars have urged courts to
wade into this thicket with caution.22 Issacharoff warns of the danger of overlooking
first-order implications: ‘[C]ourts should be wary of following their impulses to treat
such… conflicts about the structure of political systems as familiar claims of individual
rights’.23 Fraser fears the opposite, that the foundational integrity of the state will oversha-
dow second-order pleas for justice. But her solution is the same: judges must be cognisant
of how justice is framed. To do this, they must adjudicate ‘reflexively’, grappling first with
what scale of justice to use before trying to level the balance.24
I suggest there is even greater cause for judicial caution. First-order cases may be tacti-
cally disguised as second-order cases. Despite claims to the contrary, plaintiffs’ objective
may not be to liberalise the law but, quite conversely, to undermine the foundations of
governance so their own group rises to the top. This might occur where remedying
second-order injustices would have an upstream effect, eroding pre-political first-order
arrangements, much as occurred in Reynolds. As I will show next, such caution is
especially warranted in cases of settler colonialism.
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2.2. Settler colonialism and meta-politics
Colonialism, as conventionally understood, occurs where developed-world powers exert
economic, political and cultural control over exogenous subaltern territories, exploiting
the inhabitants’ labour, in combination with the land and resources, for the benefit of
the metropole. Typifying this dynamic was Europe’s centuries-long dominion over the
Global South. Since the Second World War, colonialism of this sort has retreated, with
more than 80 former colonies, encompassing 750 million residents, declaring
independence.
As Patrick Wolfe25 famously observed, a colonial variant called settler colonialism has
proved far more resilient. The United States is an archetypal settler colony; others include
Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Settler colonies may have begun conventionally, as
imperial possessions yoked for profit.26 But distinctively, they were at some point
flooded with metropolitan and other developed-world settlers. Motivated by what
Wolfe calls a ‘logic of elimination’, these settlers strived to assimilate, confine, expel or
kill the Indigenes, take their homelands, and establish ‘a new colonial society on the expro-
priated land base’.27 He states that settlers employ a sort of one-two punch. ‘Settler colo-
nialism destroys to replace’,28 with native sovereignty first dissolved and then settlers
installed. In this manner, Wolfe says, settler colonialism supplants Indigenous jurisdic-
tions with new versions of the settler motherland.
Over the past several decades, inspired by the retreat of colonialism overseas, and
empowered by domestic and international ‘rights revolutions’,29 Indigenous peoples
have mobilised against settler colonialism.30 By harnessing law and politics they now
resist demotic assimilation, pressing for acknowledgment as constitutionally discrete poli-
ties and asserting the right to enjoy group-differentiated treatment and to exercise self-
determination and autonomy.31
Yet, given the nature of settler colonialism, assertions of Indigenous political rights
encounter a distinctive challenge. Where in conventional decolonisation the colonist
‘goes home’, under all but the most radical conceptions of settler decolonisation, settlers
remain. In the United States, settlers continue to numerically dominate, retaining substan-
tial interests concerning mobility, land, voting and so forth. What is more, settler coloni-
alism too has joined the rights revolution, brandishing individual liberal rights in
opposition to decolonisation.
Much has been written about howWestern individual rights, though ostensibly neutral,
may further the subjection of subalterns. Marx, of course, felt exalting liberty promoted
selfishness and distance, protecting the bourgeoisie.32 Communitarians like Michael
Sandel and Charles Taylor see rights as atomistic, dissolving the bonds of community
that cradle the less well off.33 Feminists such as Carol Gilligan suggest ‘rights-talk’
centres the ‘masculine voice’ and foregrounds male campaigns for ‘justice’ over female
‘ethics of care’.34 Students of Indigenous law, such as Val Napoleon, argue liberal consti-
tutionalism is hostile to legal pluralism, crowding out Native legal orders.35
As well, much has been written about how, even within the logic of Western liberalism,
rights have been employed to Indigenous disadvantage.36 Will Kymlicka observes that
when states engage in ‘demographic engineering’, moving settlers into restive subaltern
regions, they may condemn as illiberal those arrangements that guard subaltern auton-
omy. He thus concludes, ‘where ethnocultural justice is absent, the rhetoric and practice
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of human rights may actually worsen the situation’.37 Similarly, Avigail Eisenberg notes
that the expansion of settler-state constitutionalism into minority jurisdictions may be
passed off as liberalisation when in fact it is the opposite – a tool ‘aimed at advancing
the collective cultural dominance of the majority’.38
This tool has been employed recurrently in settler states. In the United States, policies
such as reserve-land allotment,39 tribal termination,40 and the imposition of American
citizenship41 were in part rationalised as providing Native Americans with equal rights.
One of the most notorious such policies, the Dawes Act, was in its time hailed as the
‘Indians’Magna Carta’.42 In Canada, the declared aim of the 1969 White Paper proposing
elimination of Indigenous status was to let Indians ‘be free – free to develop Indian cul-
tures in an environment of legal, social and economic equality with other Canadians’.43
In New Zealand, champions of the Treaty of Waitangi Deletion Bill vowed to spare
Maori from a ‘destructive path of separate development’ akin to apartheid.44
Once Native sovereignty is eliminated, Indigenous collectives are left with two unhappy
options. The first is absorption into the settler body politic. The second is staying different
– no longer as a political order, but as a distinct racial group. Many scholars have observed
how Indigenous group-difference, once racialised, is often condemned as discriminatory.
Some scholars have even noted how, for Indigenous groups, racialisation may be self-
destructive. Robert Porter argues that in the United States, political Ongwehoweh misper-
ceive themselves as ethnic ‘Native Americans’, impairing tribal vitality.45 Kirsty Gover
shows that rules policing tribal citizenship in Canada,46 and disregard for Indigenous
sovereignty in Australia,47 compel Indigenous peoples to bound their own demoi in a
manner that leaves them vulnerable to racial-discrimination claims.
Yet little research has considered how settlers, pursuing a ‘logic of elimination’, have in
recent decades weaponised liberalism, moving it from the realm of rhetoric into the arena
of the courts – and how, in doing so, settlers assert rights in a manner that undermines the
foundations of Indigenous governance, altering the answer to ‘who are the people?’Where
Indigenous peoples assert sovereignty, settlers may strive to eradicate that sovereignty,
delegitimising the pre-colonial ‘them’ and replacing it with ‘us’.
As Wolfe might predict, settlers weaponise voting rights through a two-phase
approach. Rohrer discerns this approach when she observes that in Rice v. Cayetano set-
tlers sought first to ‘problematize collective native identity’ and then ‘naturalize white
settler subjectivity via a color-blind ideology’.48 Specifically, settlers first charged that exist-
ing laws of democracy – laws that were the epiphenomenal, downstream effect of first-
order Indigenous sovereignty – violated second-order individual rights. By framing Indi-
genous peoples as seeking to illiberally subject fellow citizens to racial discrimination,
rather than as a pre-political sovereign exercising self-determination, Indigenous polities
were attacked at their demotic foundations. The second settler move was to appeal for the
law to be reformed to treat individuals equally. Such liberalisation, of course, had trans-
formative upstream impacts, opening Indigenous jurisdictions to domination by the
greater settler demos.
Hence I suggest that, per the aforementioned warnings, courts should be cautious about
(mis)framing settler-constitutional challenges as second-order appeals to liberal fairness.
Rather, such challenges may sometimes be more coherently understood as camouflaged
attacks on Indigenous structures of governance, with settlers deploying rights in a
manner that serves less to liberalise than to dominate – to ‘colonise the demos’.
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In the following three sections I show how this dynamic played out in a trio of recent
settler-voting-rights cases in the US Pacific.
3. The Hawaiian case, Rice v. Cayetano (2000)
Hawaii, the largest island group in Polynesia, occupies just over 4,000 square miles of land
in the central Pacific Ocean. Its population is 1.4 million, of which Native Hawaiians and
other Pacific Islanders comprise 10%, Asian-Americans 37%, whites 27%, and mixed-race
people and ‘others’ 26%.49
Native Hawaiians have inhabited Hawaii for well over a millennium. The first outsider,
Captain James Cook, arrived in 1778. Yet for more than a century thereafter, Hawaii
remained sovereign, governed by Native Hawaiian monarchs and eventually boasting a
constitution, foreign consulates and formal recognition by the United States and European
powers. In 1893, American settlers, backed by US troops, overthrew Queen Lili’uokalani.
US annexation followed. Native Hawaiians, unlike mainland Native Americans, were not
granted federal recognition as a ‘semi-sovereign tribal entity’.50 Still, Congress at times
acted as their guardian, including by reserving 200,000 acres for Native homesteading.
In 1959 the residents of Hawaii, most of whom by then were settlers,51 voted for statehood.
The United States thus successfully petitioned the United Nations to removed Hawaii
from its list of colonised territories.52 The Native homesteading lands were entrusted to
the state ‘for the betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians’.
In the 1960s, Native Hawaiians mobilised for self-determination, with some calling for
federal tribal status like Native Americans and others demanding reestablishment of
Hawaiian sovereignty. They enjoyed a number of qualified successes. In 1978, the state
of Hawaii amended its constitution to create the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), a
semi-autonomous agency that would be the principal administrator of programmes tar-
geting Native Hawaiians and would manage their entrusted lands. The OHA was to be
governed by a board of trustees elected exclusively by ‘Hawaiians’, defined as descendants
of persons inhabiting Hawaii when Europeans arrived in 1778. In 1993, the centennial of
Lili’uokalani’s overthrow, Congress apologised for this injustice and conceded that Native
Hawaiians had not legally relinquished sovereignty. The US departments of Interior and
Justice issued a report calling for government-to-government relations with Native Hawai-
ians in the same manner as with mainland tribes. At the time, the most logical Native
Hawaiian governing body was felt to be the OHA.53
But, observes J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, these Native Hawaiian victories prompted a settler
backlash: ‘a series of lawsuits by white Americans… attempting to eradicate Hawaiian-
specific institutions in the name of civil rights’.54 The most prominent was Rice
v. Cayetano.
3.1. The case
Rice v. Cayetano was filed by Harold ‘Freddy’ Rice, a non-Native Hawaiian who had
applied to participate in an election for OHA trustees. His application was rejected
because, though he was a fifth-generation state resident, he lacked Hawaiian ancestry
dating from 1778. Rice sued, alleging violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to
equal protection of the laws and his Fifteenth Amendment right to vote regardless of
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race.55 The District Court of the State of Hawaii ruled against Rice, as did the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Rice appealed again, to the US Supreme Court. Supporting amici curiae
were filed by conservative attorneys, including former Supreme Court nominee Robert
Bork and now-Justice Brett Kavanaugh. In 2000 the Supreme Court took up his case.
The State of Hawaii, in its statement to the high court, maintained that its impugned
voter-classification scheme hinged on lineage, not race. It argued that, with the requisite
in-state roots, a person who by blood was almost fully white could vote in the OHA elec-
tion; without those roots, a full-blood Polynesian could not. The state further argued that,
even if the court found the voting scheme to be race-based, it was nonetheless constitu-
tionally defensible, on three grounds.
First, the state noted that in Morton v. Mancari the Supreme Court had upheld certain
federal preferences for Native Americans. This is because tribes retain ‘quasi-sovereign
authority’, respect for which requires group-differentiated treatment of tribal members.
Second, the state argued that OHA elections were ‘special purpose elections’ not unlike
that which the Supreme Court, in Salyer v. Tulare, had exempted from ‘one-person,
one vote’. (Salyer involved a regional water-use board created to manage irrigation; the
court had decided that voting for board members could be weighted in favour of larger
landowners). Third, the state argued that its voting scheme was necessary to ensure
proper alignment between the fiduciaries of the OHA trust and the beneficiaries, Native
Hawaiians.
3.2. The ruling
In a 7–2 decision, the Supreme Court disagreed. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the
majority, ruled that the state had abridged the Fifteenth Amendment. That amendment,
Kennedy stated, affirms ‘the equality of the races at the most basic level of the democratic
process, the exercise of the voting franchise’.56
Dismissing the state’s argument that its OHA-election qualifications hinge not on race
but lineage, Kennedy declared, ‘Ancestry can be a proxy for race. It is that proxy here’.57
He found that both the purpose and effect of limiting voting to ‘Hawaiians’ was to treat
them as a race. He noted that the court, in numerous Jim Crow-era rulings, had expressly
forbidden voting restrictions that, while race-neutral on their face, were racial in intent
and outcome. Kennedy characterised such restrictions as demeaning to ‘the dignity and
worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential
qualities’, and ‘corruptive of the whole legal order democratic elections seek to preserve’.58
Kennedy went on to attack the state’s argument that, even if its voting scheme was
found to be race-based, it should be upheld regardless. He questioned whether Mancari
applies to Hawaii, noting that Congress had neither clearly assigned quasi-sovereign
status to Native Hawaiians nor clearly authorised the state to treat them as such. Even
if it had, he stated, Congress may not empower a state to conduct race-based public elec-
tions. ‘If a non-Indian lacks a right to vote in tribal elections, it is for the reason that such
elections are the internal affair of a quasi-sovereign’, he wrote. ‘The OHA elections, by
contrast, are the affair of the State of Hawaii’.59
Kennedy then challenged the state’s other arguments, in effect maintaining that racial
classifications could not be excused by the narrowly tailored nature of ‘special purpose
elections’, nor by the goal of aligning the interests of ‘the fiduciaries and the beneficiaries
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of a trust’. Finally, while acknowledging Native Hawaiians’ ambitions for decolonisation,
Kennedy insisted the Constitution prevails:
When the culture and way of life of a people are all but engulfed by a history beyond their
control, their sense of loss may extend down through generations; and their dismay may be
shared by many members of the larger community. As the State of Hawaii attempts to
address these realities, it must, as always, seek the political consensus that begins with a
sense of shared purpose. One of the necessary beginning points is this principle: The Consti-
tution of the United States, too, has become the heritage of all the citizens of Hawaii.60
Writing for the minority, Justice John Paul Stevens disagreed. He maintained that even if
Congress never formally recognised Native Hawaiians as a tribe, it had long treated them
as such, most notably when it issued the 1993 apology. Stevens wrote, ‘there is simply no
invidious discrimination present in this effort to see that indigenous peoples are compen-
sated for past wrongs’.61 To find otherwise, he argued, placed them in a perverse bind. ‘It is
a painful irony indeed to conclude that native Hawaiians are not entitled to special benefits
designed to restore a measure of native self-governance because they currently lack any
vestigial native government – a possibility of which history and the actions of this
Nation have deprived them’.62
Following the decision, settlers launched further lawsuits attacking state and federal
programmes containing provisions relating to Native Hawaiian education, health and
housing. According to Linda Zhang, the ‘threat to the very existence of these programs
led to a frantic rush to attain federal recognition for Native Hawaiians’.63 In 2000, US
Senator Daniel Akaka, a Democrat from Hawaii, proposed the ‘Akaka Bill’, to establish
a Native Hawaiian governing body and acknowledge Native Hawaiians’ right to self-deter-
mination. Republicans condemned the bill as a ‘plan for a race-based government’.64 Con-
versely, some Native Hawaiians argued that the bill did not go far enough in righting past
wrongs and securing self-determination.65 Akaka’s proposal has since been repeatedly
amended, including to preclude Hawaiian secession. Still, Congress has so far rejected it.
4. The CNMI case, Davis v. Commonwealth Election Commission (2016)
CNMI consists of 14 islands, comprising 184 square miles of land, in the Marianas chain of
Micronesia. Its population is approximately 54,000, of which 24% are Indigenous Cha-
morro, 11% other Pacific islanders, 50% of Asian origin, and 15% mixed-race people
and ‘others’.66
Chamorros occupied the Northern Marianas for at least four millennia before coming
under Spanish dominion in the sixteenth century. After the Spanish-AmericanWar, Spain
sold the islands to Germany, which lost them to Japan in the First World War. Following
Japan’s defeat in the Second World War, the United Nations included the Northern Mari-
anas in a trust territory administered by the United States. The trusteeship agreement
required that the United States promote territorial self-government and protect inhabi-
tants ‘against loss of their lands’.67 Though the trust’s other jurisdictions (the Federated
States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau) eventually gained independence,
the Northern Marianas opted to become a US commonwealth.
This status was sealed by a 1976 covenant between the Northern Marianas and the
United States as two sovereigns. The covenant established CNMI self-government by a
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popularly elected governor and legislature. As well, despite the Supreme Court’s Insular
Cases doctrine, which limits application of the Constitution in unincorporated territories
to those rights deemed ‘fundamental’, and blocks application in circumstances that would
be ‘impractical and anomalous’,68 the covenant explicitly applied the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments to CNMI.
Yet the commonwealth covenant further required that CNMI draft a territorial consti-
tution in which certain distinctive provisions would be enshrined.69 Among these was
Article XII, prohibiting acquisition of land by persons not ‘of Northern Marianas
descent’. This ban on alienation of Indigenous land mirrored US policy under trusteeship.
It also paralleled guarantees in federal Indian Law relating tomainlandNativeAmericans.70
Per the covenant, Article XII is necessary ‘in view of the importance of the ownership of land
for the culture and traditions of the people of the NorthernMariana Islands, and in order to
protect them against exploitation and to promote their economic advancement and self-
sufficiency’. The covenant forbids the US government from unilaterally altering the land-
alienation prohibition, and explicitly exempts it from the US Constitution.
The 1990 federal appeals court rulingWabol v. Villacrusis substantiated this exemption.
When a plaintiff charged that Article XII violates the Fourteenth Amendment, the court
found otherwise. It held that the right of outsiders to buy land is not ‘fundamental’, and
thus, per the Insular Cases, not constitutionally protected in CNMI. Further, the court
declared that the United States ought not be forced to break the terms it agreed to in
the covenant.71 Wrote the court, ‘The Bill of Rights was not intended to interfere with
the performance of our international obligations. Nor was it intended to operate as a gen-
ocide pact for diverse native cultures.… Its bold purpose was to protect minority rights,
not to enforce homogeneity’.72
In the same year, the United Nations removed the Northern Marianas from its list of
colonised territories. However, land-alienation efforts continued. Article XII had been
written to be potentially time-limited. Unless renewed by a referendum, it would expire
twenty-five years after the dissolution of US trusteeship. Trusteeship officially ended in
1986. In 1999, the CNMI legislature amended the territorial constitution so only electors
of ‘Northern Marianas descent’, defined as those with roots in CNMI dating back to 1950,
could vote in referenda concerning amending Article XII. In 2011, for the purposes of such
a referendum, the legislature established an official registry of voters of Northern Marianas
descent. In 2012, the case Davis v. Commonwealth Election Commission was filed, challen-
ging the exclusion of non-Marianas descendants from Article XII referenda.
4.1. The case
Davis was filed in the federal district court of CNMI by John Davis Jr, a non-Chamorro
CNMI resident excluded from the official registry of voters of Northern Marianas
descent. He charged that this contravened his voting rights under the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments. The district court agreed, citingRice v. Cayetano. The commonwealth
government then appealed that ruling to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
In its statement to the appeals court, the commonwealth maintained that its voting
scheme differed in at least two significant ways from the Hawaiian scheme invalidated
by Rice. First, it argued that ‘NorthernMarianas descendants’was not a race-based classifi-
cation. Where Hawaii sought to enfranchise only voters with roots pre-dating European
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contact, CNMI’s scheme encompassed a multi-ethnic political community ‘who rebuilt
the Northern Mariana Islands after the devastation of the Second World War’ and ‘the
descendants of those individuals that remained in the Northern Mariana Islands and
improved the work of their forebears’.73 The commonwealth showed that not just Cha-
morros but various races inhabited CNMI in 1950; hence, referendum voters would not
be mono-ethnic.
Second, the commonwealth maintained that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments are not germane. That is because CNMI, unlike Hawaii, is an unincorporated ter-
ritory where, per the US Supreme Court’s Insular Cases, the Constitution does not fully
apply. Though the 1976 covenant imported those amendments to the islands, it simul-
taneously exempted land-alienation restrictions from Constitutional scrutiny. The com-
monwealth argued that, as controlling land alienation is intimately related to
controlling who can vote on land alienation, the impugned voting qualifications should
likewise be constitutionally exempt.
Finally, the commonwealthmaintained that even if the court deemed ‘NorthernMarianas
descendants’ to be a racial group, and even if the Fourteenth andFifteenthAmendmentswere
found to apply in this case, the restrictions shouldnonetheless stand. This is because theywere
narrowly tailored to fulfil a compelling state interest – namely, to insure that the groupwhose
lands were protected in the covenant will control any changes to that protection.
4.2. The ruling
In December 2016, in a unanimous decision, the appeals court found in favour of Davis.
Chief Judge Sidney Thomas penned the terse decision, condemning CNMI’s voting
scheme as both race-based and offensive to the Fifteenth Amendment.
Thomas declared the court’s findings to be controlled by Rice. He ruled that, similarly to
Rice, the category ‘NorthernMarianas descendants’ functions as a proxy for race. As well, he
found that analogies toAmerican Indian tribes are, in theMarianas as inHawaii, inapplicable.
CNMI’s Indigenous peoplewere never congressionally recognised as a ‘quasi-sovereign’; thus
they do not enjoy constitutionally distinct political status. As well, Thomas scoffed at the
notion that Northern Marianas descendants’ exclusive participation in the proposed land-
alienation referendum is justified by their supposedly greater stake in the outcome. All
CNMI residents, he declared, will be affected by the referendum, and thus deserve to vote.
Thomas additionally maintained that, unlike the prohibition on land-alienation at issue
in Wabol, the present infringement is not shielded by the commonwealth covenant.
‘Limits on who may own land are quite different – conceptually, politically, and legally
– than limits on who may vote in elections to amend a constitution’.74 As well, Thomas
argued that the Insular Cases do not apply. Per the covenant, he found the Fifteenth
Amendment is fully applicable in CNMI and thus ‘fundamental’.
Following Thomas’ ruling, the commonwealth government petitioned the US Supreme
Court for reconsideration. In October 2017 the high court denied that petition.
5. The Guam case, Davis v. Guam (2017)
At 212 square miles, Guam is the largest island of Micronesia and the southern-most
island in the Marianas chain. Its population is approximately 167,000, of which
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Indigenous Chamorros comprise 37%, other Pacific Islanders 12%, people of Asian origin
34%, whites 7%, and mixed-race people and ‘others’ 10%.75
As with neighbouring CNMI, Guam has for millennia been a Chamorro homeland.
Chamorros began experiencing ‘cultural genocide’ after Spaniards arrived in the sixteenth
century.76 Between 1668 and 1740 the Chamorro population dropped from approximately
80,000 to 5,000.77 The United States assumed control of Guam following the 1898
Spanish-American War. In 1950, Guamanians – of whom at the time almost 99% were
Chamorros78 – were made US citizens under the Organic Act. At the same time there
was ‘an express acknowledgment by Congress, in the relevant congressional reports sur-
rounding the enactment of Guam’s Organic Act, of its “international obligations” to
usher the territory toward a fuller measure of self-government’.79 In 1968 an amendment
to the Organic Act extended various sections of the US Constitution to Guam, including
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and the Fifteenth Amendment.
Guam, unlike CNMI, has not officially exercised self-determination. It thus remains on
the United Nations’ list of colonised territories. Its relationship with the United States has
been neither voted upon by Guamanians nor enshrined in a covenant. This is not for want
of trying. In a 1982 plebiscite open to all registered voters, Guamanians supported com-
monwealth status. Guam’s legislature thus submitted a draft commonwealth act to Con-
gress. The draft included a requirement that final ratification of commonwealth status be
limited to Chamorros. Congress opposed this limitation and negotiations broke down.
Guam has resubmitted the draft act in every subsequent Congressional session, to no
avail.80
Guam’s legislature thus began the decolonisation process on its own, mandating that
there be held ‘a political status plebiscite to conform to the international obligations of
the United States in administering Guam as a non-self-governing territory’.81 As laid
out in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1541, which concerns compliance
with the principles of self-determination, the plebiscite would offer three choices: indepen-
dence, ‘free association’ with the United States, or statehood.
To this end, Guam’s legislature established a Commission on Decolonization and set up
the Guam Decolonization Registry, enrolling voters who would be permitted to participate
in a non-binding plebiscite. Enrolment was initially limited to ‘Chamorro people of
Guam’. Immediately after the Rice ruling, that wording was changed to ‘native inhabitants
of Guam’, defined as those Guamanians who became US citizens under the 1950 Organic
Act and their descendants. By law, the plebiscite must be conducted when 70% of ‘native
inhabitants of Guam’ join the registry. So far that threshold has not been reached.
5.1. The case
Davis v. Guam was filed in 2011 by Arnold Davis (no relation to John Davis Jr), a non-
Chamorro Guamanian blocked from the Guam Decolonization Registry. He was rep-
resented by the Centre for Individual Rights, a Washington, DC-based conservative
non-profit known for its anti-affirmative action work. Citing Rice, Davis charged the gov-
ernment of Guam with ‘audacious racial discrimination’82 contravening the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments. The district court of Guam initially found his claim
‘unripe’ and lacking legal standing. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, prompt-
ing the district court to revisit the case.
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In its statement to the district court, the government of Guam argued that the Decolo-
nization Registry is not race-based. The registry’s intent, the government argued, is to
enfranchise a federally created political class: Guamanians, and descendants thereof,
who became citizens under the Organic Act and to whom obligations are stilled owed
under international law. This, the government insisted, made Davis v. Guam different
from both Rice and the CNMI case, Davis v. Commonwealth Election Commission. More-
over, the registry’s effect would be non-racial. Not just Chamorros but various ethnicities
inhabited Guam in 1950; hence, enrolees would be multi-ethnic.
Further, the government of Guam maintained that in this case, unlike Rice, the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments are not applicable. Guam is an unincorporated terri-
tory, where, per the Insular Cases, the Constitution does not apply in full force. Hence,
voting in the decolonisation plebiscite is not a ‘fundamental right’. Moreover, the govern-
ment argued, applying the Constitution to Guam in a manner that blocks inhabitants from
exercising their acknowledged right to self-determination would be ‘impractical and
anomalous’ and ‘an outcome proscribed in the Insular Cases’.83
5.2. The ruling
In March 2017, the court issued its ruling, finding in favour of Davis. Judge Frances
Tydingco-Gatewood penned the decision. She ruled that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments are fundamental in Guam. Despite Guam’s unincorporated status, she
noted, Congress explicitly extended both amendments to the territory under the
Organic Act.
Citing Rice, she stated that the Fifteenth Amendment forbids ancestry-based voter qua-
lifications that act as a proxy for race. Likewise, it bars qualifications that, though on their
face racially neutral, are race-based in intent and effect. The classification ‘native inhabi-
tant of Guam’, she stated, fails on both counts. Per an analysis of the registry’s legislative
history, she ruled that legislators clearly intended to preference Chamorros. Further, given
that almost 99% of the people made citizens under the 1950 Organic Act were Chamorro,
the registry would have precisely that effect.
Tydingco-Gatewood noted that, under the Equal Protection Clause, racial distinctions
are permissible only when narrowly tailored so as not to exclude substantially affected
parties. Yet, she found, ‘ascertaining the future political relationship of Guam to the
United States is a public issue that affects not just the Native Inhabitants of Guam but
rather the entire people of Guam. Every Guam resident otherwise qualified to vote can
claim a profound interest in the outcome of the Plebiscite’.84
Finally, the judge addressed the territory’s arguments that the impugned voting limit-
ations are necessary for self-determination. As to international obligations, she stated,
‘Defendants… failed to provide this court with any legal authority – whether it be inter-
national law or a binding international treaty – that allows for this court to disregard or
circumvent the U.S. Constitution’.85 And even if such international obligations were
proven, she suggested it would nonetheless be unconstitutional for the Guamanian gov-
ernment – instead of, for example, a non-profit corporation – to conduct a race-based
plebiscite.
Tydingco-Gatewood concluded, ‘The court recognizes the long history of colonization
of this island and its people, and the desire of those colonized to have their right to self-
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determination. However, the court must also recognize the right of others who have made
Guam their home’.86
In August 2017, Guam appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court. It opened its
appeal with a dramatic statement: ‘This case is a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Although styled
as a reverse discrimination case… [t]his case seeks to deny the “native inhabitants of
Guam”… from effectively exercising their right to express by plebiscite their desires
regarding their future political relationship with the United States of America’.87 Taking
an opposite stand was the US Department of Justice, which filed an amicus brief support-
ing Davis. As of September 2018 the appeals court had not ruled.
6. Analysis and conclusion
I contend that these three legal battles in the US Pacific – Rice v. Cayetano, Davis
v. Commonwealth Election Commission, and Davis v. Guam – showcase how settler-colo-
nial assertions of rights may in effect colonise Indigenous demoi. From this web, at least
four distinct strands may be teased out.
First, Rice, Davis and Davis all highlight the use of a rather novel and understudied
settler ‘strategy of elimination’: the assertion of individual voting rights in a manner
that undermines Indigenous sovereigns and replaces them with universal, settler-domi-
nated demoi. This strategy might indeed be seen as ‘a wolf in sheep’s clothing’. In Rice,
the settler plaintiff, Freddy Rice, charged that Hawaii’s voting scheme, instituted to
empower Native Hawaiians in the manner of a ‘quasi-sovereign tribal entity’ and to
provide them with a measure of self-determination, infringed his right to vote under
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. In Davis v. Commonwealth Election Commis-
sion, John Davis Jr claimed violation of the same voting rights, attacking as illiberal
CNMI’s effort to provide people of Northern Marianas descent with control over
alienation of their lands. Finally, in Davis v. Guam, Arnold Davis cited the same rights
to challenge Guam’s effort to provide native inhabitants with self-determination.
Second, in all three cases the plaintiffs employed a specific strategy involving dual
moves of destruction and then construction. I suggest this strategy reflects Wolfe’s assess-
ment that settler colonialism ‘destroys to replace’.88 Even more precisely, I suggest these
dual moves were presciently discerned by Rohrer, who, in analysing Rice, observed that
the plaintiff sought to ‘problematize collective native identity’ and then ‘naturalize white
settler subjectivity via a color-blind ideology’.89 Let me try to trace this dynamic.
In bringing their cases, Freddy Rice, John Davis Jr and Arnold Davis all claimed viola-
tion of rights of the second-order variety, concerning what Issacharoff and others call laws
of democracy. Again, such laws govern the democratic process and attach to individuals,
not polities. Such laws may thus appear quite removed from such meta-political questions
as ‘who are the people?’ But clearly, these impugned laws of democracy in Hawaii, CNMI
and Guam were all downstream effects of distinct structures of democracy, designed to
treat Indigenous peoples as first-order demoi. In Hawaii, the law governing OHA
voting flowed downstream from the state’s attempt to acknowledge Native Hawaiians
as a tribal entity. In CNMI, the law governing voting in land-alienation referenda
flowed from the commonwealth’s effort to affirm Northern Marianas descendants as a
pre-political polity whose land rights were enshrined in the commonwealth’s founding
covenant. In Guam, the law limiting who could vote on decolonisation flowed from the
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government’s attempt to treat native inhabitants as a first-order demos owed self-determi-
nation under international law.
In all three cases, the plaintiffs’ attacks on downstream voting laws produced effects that
rippled back upstream. In this manner, as Rohrer put it, ‘collective native identity’ was
‘problematized’. Consequently, the three courts were called upon to examine these collec-
tive identities – to determinate the legal status of the Hawaiian, Marianan and Guamanian
Indigenous demoi. Were these demoi, like the US Senate, constitutionally enshrined? Or
were they more like the Alabama state senate districts in Reynolds – groupings that ‘never
were and never have been considered as sovereign entities’? In each case the courts con-
cluded the latter, that the Indigenous groups were not first-order rights-bearers. This result
undermined Indigenous political selfhood. It may be seen as an example of Wolfe’s
destructive dimension of settler colonialism.
But of course, Rice, Davis Jr and Davis appealed not merely for Indigenous voter-pre-
ferencing to be invalidated, but for voting to be liberalised. As Rohrer again discerned, this
move ‘naturaliz[ed] white settler subjectivity via a color-blind ideology’. While liberalising
voting in each case may have seemed an innocuous second-order reform, the effect of
course again flowed upstream. Opening decisions concerning Indigenous affairs to
every resident of Hawaii, CNMI and Guam has the consequence of redefining the struc-
ture of democracy that governs those affairs. The boundaries of the relevant demoi have
been redrawn so as to encompass not just ‘Native Hawaiians’, ‘Northern Marianas descen-
dants’ and ‘native inhabitants of Guam’, but all state voters. Of course, this empowers set-
tlers, who in each case comprise the islands’ overwhelming majorities. Settlers now have
the opportunity to control management of the Hawaiian OHA, land-alienation in CNMI,
and decolonisation in Guam. This may be seen as exemplifying Wolfe’s constructive
dimension of settler colonialism.
Third, all three cases show how the success of the forgoing settler legal strategy hinged on
how justice was framed. Clearly, Justice Kennedy approached Rice through a second-order,
law-of-democracy frame. FindingNativeHawaiians to lack federally protected status, he con-
cluded that the relevant rights-bearers were downstream individuals, not upstream demoi.
From this perspective, the rights of Freddy Rice were clearly abridged. Justice Stevens, mean-
while, approached Rice through a first-order, structure-of-democracy frame, seeing the key
subjects of justice as demoi. From his perspective, Native Hawaiians were a rights-bearing
demos the protection of which trumps downstream individual voting rights.
Similarly, Judge Thomas approached Davis v. Commonwealth Election Commission
through a second-order frame. Finding individual voting rights to apply in CNMI due
to the commonwealth covenant and despite the Insular Cases, and conversely finding
‘Northern Marianas descendants’ to lack quasi-sovereign status, he too concluded that
the only germane rights-bearers in the case were individuals. From this perspective, the
downstream rights of John Davis Jr were clearly abridged, while the upstream Indigenous
demos had no rights to stand on. This was a dramatically different framing than had been
applied in Wabol, where the rights of non-Indigenous individuals to buy land were
trumped by the aim of averting the ‘genocide’ of, and fulfilling ‘international obligations’
to, Indigenous Chamorros.
In Davis v. Guam, the framing of Judge Tydingco-Gatewood’s decision mirrored that of
the Hawaii and CNMI rulings. Citing the Organic Act, and despite the Insular Cases, the
judge framed Arnold Davis as a legitimate bearer of individual voting rights. At the same
POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES 145
time, despite Congressional reports and international obligations, she found Indigenous
Guamanians to lack an actionable right of self-determination. Framing the case through
a second-order rather than first-order lens, the result was all but foreordained.
Fourth and finally, Rice, Davis and Davis show that, when settler colonists strategically
assert individual voting rights, and where justice is framed so as to validate that strategy, a
meta-political conquest may result. Settlers, able to dissolve the Indigenous ‘them’ into the
settler ‘we’, may achieve power over Indigenous peoples and lands. They may ‘colonise the
demos’. That is, at least for now, what has happened on the utmost frontier of American
settler expansion, the US Pacific.
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ABSTRACT
Between Indigenous sovereignty and settler colonisation lie
contested frontiers. I suggest Australia’s Northern Territory is one
such frontier. This paper explores the 1998 settler campaign for
Northern Territory statehood, the key to which was the framing of
a constitution designed to eliminate Indigenous autonomy and
empower settlers. I make three contributions. First, I showcase
how settler colonialism is metapolitical, implicating political
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Indigenous territories as ‘ours’ and Indigenous demoi as ‘us’.
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Finally, I show that when Indigenous peoples resist by seeking to
constitutionally entrench their own, alternate answers to the
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Of all the political units in the developed world, the most dichotomous may be Australia’s
Northern Territory. On the map it is an arbitrary rectangle, nearly as big as Mongolia,
overlaying ‘outback par excellence’1 – the monsoonal tropics of the Top End, scrubby ran-
geland, and the parched deserts of the Red Centre. Jurisdictionally it is ‘a land left over’,2
the only large swath of Australia lacking statehood. Whereas Australia’s states are consti-
tutionally sovereign, the Northern Territory is a ward of the federal government, which
adopted it in 1911 after first New South Wales and then South Australia found it too
hard to tame. Even today it remains ‘the least successfully colonised political unit in Aus-
tralia’.3 Vast expanses are de facto Indigenous domains where ‘settler’ Australians still
rarely intrude. Thus, the territory has been characterised as an ideational frontier,
caught ‘between the known and the unknown, the civilized and the rude, the safe and
the dangerous, the ordered and the anarchic’.4 I suggest it is also a metapolitical frontier,
where demoi and territory are in limbo.
Is the Northern Territory theirs or ours? Are its people us or them? Who decides, and
how? Questions like these are the stuff of metapolitics. They may seem esoteric. Far from
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it. I submit they are constitutive, establishing the foundations from which polities rise.
Underpinning any political community are subjective claims about who ‘we, the people’
are and what place is rightfully ours. If those underpinnings erode – or, as I will
suggest in this article, if they are deliberately subverted – the community, atomised and
dispossessed, will be no more.
This study examines the clash in 1998 between Indigenous peoples and settlers over
whether the Northern Territory should become Australia’s seventh state, and over the
drafting and entrenchment of antithetical charters to either constitute the new state in
the image of Australia’s other, settler-colonial states, or, conversely, to guard and
augment the region’s unique degree of Indigenous self-determination.
My aim is threefold. First, by revealing how the Northern Territory government, as a
key to its statehood bid, propounded a constitution that would in effect absorb Indigenous
demoi and territory, I hope to show how settler colonisation is at base metapolitical, con-
fronting political theory’s ‘boundary question’ in an effort to reconstitute Indigenous ter-
ritories and demoi as ‘ours’ and ‘us’. Second, I will show that, as on other modern settler
frontiers, this metapolitical campaign in the Northern Territory was waged largely by
leveraging liberal rights, wielded to impugn as illiberal, and thus de-constitute, Indigenous
boundaries. Finally, I will show that, when Indigenous peoples defended their demotic and
territorial legitimacy, propounding constitutions that substantiated their own, alternate
answers to the ‘boundary question’, there arose a contest over the ‘framing of justice’ –
over whether individual settler rights, on one hand, or Indigenous boundaries, on the
other, were the rightful ‘subject of justice’.
I proceed thusly. First I lay out a theory of the metapolitics of settler colonialism. Then I
explore the historical, demographic, political and legal circumstances of the Northern Ter-
ritory. Next, I consider the 1998 Northern Territory Constitutional Convention, examin-
ing it – its composition, mandate, speeches, amendments, resolutions, protests, media
coverage, and resultant draft constitution – through the lens of settler metapolitics. I
then do the same with two subsequent, countervailing Indigenous constitutional conven-
tions. Finally, I analyse and conclude.
Settler colonialism and the ‘boundary problem’
The world teems with others – with peoples, occupying places, exercising or demanding to
exercise self-determination. Where once the very notion of self-determination was contro-
versial, today most leaders, lawyers and theorists agree it is a right.5 Yet this agreement is,
Margalit and Raz observe, ‘but the eye of a raging storm concerning the precise definition
of the right, its content, its bearers, and the proper means of its implementation’.6 Few pro-
blems are more vexing: Who is a political self, and where may they self-determine?
This problem is vexing in part because neither democracy nor liberalism can solve it.
Indeed, it presents a chicken-and-egg dilemma – political theory’s ‘boundary problem’.
If democracy is rule by the people, who are the people and where do they rule? The
first part of this problem was captured by Jennings: ‘the people cannot decide until
someone decides who are the people’.7 He meant democracy is useless for identifying pol-
itical communities. Liberalism is barely more helpful. A core liberal tenet is egalitarianism,
holding that all individuals are moral equals.8 Another common liberal principle is uni-
versalism,9 ‘affirming the moral unity of the human species’.10 Thus liberals, while
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backing self-determination in theory, are loathe to discriminate between ‘we, the people’
and others.
The second part of the problem, ‘where do the people rule’, is similarly difficult. Typi-
cally, self-determination is associated with territorial authority. Indeed, the two mutually
reinforce. Americans are those people who govern in America, that place governed by
Americans. Yet, as with identifying demoi, staking territory cannot happen democrati-
cally. How can voters vote on their voting district? Similarly, despite attempts by liberal
thinkers from Locke11 to Kolers12 and Stilz13 to articulate theories of rightful territory,
few justice problems remain so intractable as how to divide up the world.
Boundaries, then, are unacceptable yet inevitable – illiberal and undemocratic on one
hand, essential to self-determination on the other. Hence Issacharoff calls bounding a
‘first order challenge’, that must be considered in a manner ‘constitutionally prior’ to
democracy itself.14 This of course means, to make a political community, bounding
must occur first. Bounding is politics’ primordial event, constituting the ‘who’ and
‘where’ of governance. But it also means for a community to endure, its bounds must
remain, if not precisely fixed, then at least under its control. A political community, like
an edifice, requires stable underpinnings. If exogenous actors subvert its boundaries, it
is unmade.
Due to the boundary problem, democracies’ creation stories are often unsavoury. Fre-
quently their boundaries emerged from pre-liberal history, were forged in violence, or
were fixed in the extra-legal vacuum of a ‘constitutional moment’. Regardless, once
‘who are the people and where do they rule’ was determined, state-makers could move
on to less-messy matters, including ‘second order’ arrangements. Unlike first-order
bounding decisions, which frame demoi and territories, second-order arrangements
relate to individuals. Rather than enshrining collective self-determination, they formalise
and protect liberal rights.
Yet even in the most venerable liberal democracies, liberal protections are never separ-
able from the state’s illiberal roots. Individual rights complexly interact with ‘constitution-
ally prior’ demotic and territorial boundaries. Often, these interactions exhibit an
‘upstream/downstream’ dynamic. A familiar example involves US federalism. Because
of the Great Compromise, Wyoming, the least populous state, and California, the most,
enjoy equal representation in the US Senate. This first-order deal has staggering conse-
quences ‘downstream’, on second-order rights. Because senatorial representation is
equal qua state it is unequal qua voter. Individual Wyomingites wield more voting
power than Californians, transgressing ‘one person, one vote’. Clearly, the illiberalism
of America’s upstream federal bounding decisions has downstream ramifications, imping-
ing on liberal rights.
Where these bounding decisions are constitutionally enshrined, their effects are
unyielding. Despite how Californians may feel about Wyoming’s equality qua demos,
the Great Compromise seems here to stay. But what if boundaries are not enshrined?
Then a dilemma arises over their legitimacy. As noted, democracy cannot resolve such
dilemmas. Nor can liberal justice: Which should prevail, collective self-determination or
individual rights? Hence Fraser situates such dilemmas within ‘abnormal justice’.15
‘Normal justice’ is about balancing the proverbial scale of justice until equilibrium is
achieved. But in ‘abnormal’ conditions, where ‘constitutionally prior’ assumptions are
in dispute, Fraser suggests deciders must begin with meta-questions. Which is the
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correct scale to use? How should justice be framed? Who or what is the appropriate
‘subject of justice’? Such questions are fundamental because the frame may foreordain
the result.
Consider the 1964 US Supreme Court case Reynolds v. Sims. There, voters from popu-
lous Jefferson County, Alabama, challenged the apportioning of state senate seats equally
qua county, arguing it diminished their voting power relative to voters in less populous
counties. Alabama responded with the ‘federal analogy’ – if the US Senate does it, why
can’t we? But the high court found that, unlike states, ‘subdivisions of states – counties,
cities, or whatever – never were and never have been considered as sovereign entities’.16
The court in effect ruled that Alabama’s counties are not legitimate first-order polities.
Unlike Wyoming, they are not owed collective self-determination. Hence, concern for
their demotic integrity did not trump downstream rights. By framing the plaintiffs, not
the counties, as the appropriate subjects of justice, the result was foreordained. ‘One
person, one vote’ became the law of the land.
For the purposes of this paper, Reynolds imparts three lessons. First, not all boundary
questions are resolved at the time of state-making. As in Alabama, such questions may
erupt, precipitating clashes between first-order boundaries and second-order rights.
Second, where these clashes are won by the second order, the effect may flow upstream,
impacting the first order. Reynolds helped spur the US ‘redistricting revolution’, compel-
ling almost every state to overhaul its apportionment practices. America’s peoples and
places were re-bound. The third lesson is these upstream/downstream dynamics may be
leveraged to strategic advantage. Yes, the Reynolds plaintiffs won voting equality. But
that was not their prime goal. They were reformers for whom voting equality was a
means to an end: swinging state politics leftward.17 By leveraging second-order rights
they achieved a first-order victory, re-constituting Alabama to their own political
advantage.
While the US redistricting revolution was distinctly impactful, rights-versus-bound-
aries clashes are surprisingly common. They arise when countries enter confederal
arrangements, such as the Maastricht Treaty, which triggered charges by German voters
that their ‘electoral weight’ was being invidiously watered down,18 or when power-
sharing is imposed, such as by the Dayton Accords, which prompted claims of electoral
discrimination by members of non-consociating ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina.19 They occur when restive peoples seek to enhance their internal self-determination,
as with Quebecois nationalists and their possibly illiberal La charte de la langue française.20
And most relevant to this paper, rights-versus-boundaries clashes happen when people
from one place assert jurisdiction over another, as in settler colonialism.
Settler colonialism is, as Wolfe21 famously claimed, an insidious, tenacious variant of
the sort of conventional colonialism that once flourished in the Global South. Generally
speaking, conventional colonialism exploited native populations to enrich the European
metropole. Settler colonialism, conversely, aims to remove native peoples, making space
for settlers to reproduce the metropole – to found New Englands, New Zealands, New
Caledonias and so forth.
As I have suggested elsewhere22, settler colonialism can be understood as a metapoli-
tical conquest conducted through demotic and territorial re-bounding. Indigenous domin-
ions, like anywhere, comprise people and places, demarcated by boundaries. Settler
colonialism targets those boundaries, undermining them and instituting new boundaries
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within which setters dominate. In short, settlers colonialism re-makes ‘theirs’ as ours,
often by making ‘them’ us.
Historically, settlers did this largely through force and deception. Hence, by the early
1900s, they had absorbed hundreds of Indigenous dominions very nearly spanning
whole continents. Since then settler colonialism has been primarily about maintenance.
Indigenous boundaries, having been dissolved, were simply kept that way. Still, a few
unconquered frontiers endured. Well into the late twentieth century, in Alaska and north-
ern Canada,23 in US offshore territories,24 and, as this paper will suggest, in Australia’s
Northern Territory, Indigenous nations and homelands had not, and perhaps still have
not, been definitively reconstituted as ‘ours’. In these contested spaces, I suggest that
settler colonialism can be observed in a metapolitical offensive, preparing the ground
for settler takeover. On these frontiers, where Indigenous peoples cling to de facto and
even de jure control, settlers embark on the primordial act of re-bounding – of de-consti-
tuting, and replacing, Indigenous demoi and territories.
More so than in previous eras, such modern settler-colonial re-constitutions work by
leveraging liberal rights. Again, first-order bounding arrangements are inherently illiberal.
Hence, Indigenous boundaries constrain liberal rights of settlers. In turn, settler challenges
to those constraints push upstream, threatening Indigenous boundaries. Such challenges
target border regimes that prevent settlers from swamping Indigenous homelands and
legal regimes demarcating Indigenous demoi and territories. Indigenous groups, of
course, resist. Like the state of Alabama in Reynolds, their challenge is to constitutionally
entrench, and/or keep entrenched, their metapolitical boundaries. In such contests,
between rights and boundaries, what ensues is a conflict over Fraser’s ‘framing of justice’.
Such conflicts are not uncommon – and often, settlers prevail. For example, recently in
the US territory of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, rights-wielding
settlers broke down land-alienation protections that guarded Indigenous territorial sover-
eignty.25 In the US territory of Guam, settlers asserted their voting rights to block an Indi-
genous-only vote on decolonisation.26 And in Canada’s Northwest Territories, settlers
pushing for voter parity have repeatedly challenged electoral-boundaries regimes guarding
Indigenous peoples’ share in the territorial ‘balance of power’.27
In 1998 there played out a similar settler-colonial rights-versus-boundaries conflict in
Australia’s Northern Territory. As I will show, it was a literal clash of constitution, with
settlers and Indigenous peoples duelling to draft and entrench founding charters that
would consecrate their own, antithetical answers to the boundary problem. Indigenous
peoples sought to fix boundaries that would guard their lands and polities in the last
major Indigenous redoubt in Australia. Settlers, keen to tame this ‘last frontier’,28
sought to unbound Indigenous lands and polities and constitutionalise new boundaries
that would in effect empower settlers. To do this, settlers appealed to liberal rights.
Victory would be foreordained by the ‘framing of justice’ – by deciding whether the appro-
priate ‘subject of justice’ was upstream Indigenous sovereignty or downstream settler
rights.
Australia’s Northern Territory as a settler-colonial ‘frontier’
The Northern Territory’s residents, numbering barely 250,000, inhabit ‘two solitudes’.29
Seventy per cent are non-Indigenous, mostly bunched into the seaside capital, Darwin.
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They are disproportionately young, male and mobile; every year nearly one in six moves
into or out of the territory.30 Indigenous people comprise the other 30%, far more than
elsewhere in Australia. They are ‘permanent residents among a sea of transient[s]’.31
Beyond Darwin they predominate, three-quarters living ‘out bush’, in remote towns
and outstations.32 They belong to dozens of distinct nations, their languages, customary
laws and traditional cosmologies relatively intact, inhabiting the same ‘countries’ their for-
bears did for 60,000-plus years.
Intact, too, is their sense of political distinctiveness, a perception sharpened by the
Northern Territory’s fraught history. After European settlement, the territory became
one of the continent’s last battlegrounds. Like elsewhere in Australia, miners and pastor-
alists eschewed treaty-making in favour of the doctrine of terra nullius, defining the
country as empty to claim it for themselves. But, observe Pedersen and Phillpot, ‘what
was different about northern Australia was the sustained Aboriginal struggle against Euro-
pean incursion’.33 Spearings of frontiersmen were common. Colonial authorities
responded with massacres well into the 1920s. For decades, the territory experienced ‘a
bloody war’.34
Eventually, much of the far north and central desert were deemed unconquerable and
made into Indigenous reserves. Elsewhere, cattle stations took root, their solvency
hinging on cheap Indigenous labour.35 In 1966 Gurindji stockmen, fed up with feudal
working conditions, walked off the Wave Hill cattle station and demanded their tra-
ditional lands back. At around the same time, the Yolngu of the Gove Peninsula, oppos-
ing the establishment of a bauxite mine, issued the Bark Petition, a landmark native-title
challenge. These protests helped awaken urban Australia to the cause of Indigenous
rights.36
Flowing from this awakening, two federal laws in the 1970s reshaped territorial politics,
placing Indigenous peoples and settlers ‘on a collision course’.37 First, the federal Whitlam
government championed Indigenous land reform. Facing opposition from the states, the
government initiated reform in the key jurisdiction under its control, the Northern Ter-
ritory. The 1976 Aboriginal Land Rights Act was transformative, giving Indigenous
peoples inalienable title to 19% of the territory and opening far more to land claims.38
Within a few decades, half the territory was Indigenous-owned. A permit system was
established to regulate public access to this vastness of Indigenous country. Established
as well were the Northern and Central Land Councils, ‘para-governmental bodies’39
answerable to Indigenous voters. The councils became powerful political actors, providing
glimmerings of self-determination. Together these reforms placed Indigenous peoples in
the Northern Territory in a uniquely powerful position relative to their brethren elsewhere
in Australia.40
The second federal initiative was countervailing. The Northern Territory, as a federal
subject, had for decades been run by Canberra. Local settlers bristled at this ‘remote
control’.41 In 1948 the federal government conceded to create a territorial council,
though up until 1974 just two-thirds of its seats were elected.42 Finally, in 1978, came
the Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act, providing the territory with Westmin-
ster-style ‘responsible government’, and granting it most of the powers of a state. There
were, however, exceptions. The Northern Territory received 2, not 12, federal senators.
The federal government could override territorial legislation. Most seminally, Indigenous
land rights remained under federal purview.
6 A. J. SPITZER
From the start, Northern Territory settlers protested these ‘serious and continuing irri-
tants’.43 The territory’s founding governing party, the pro-development Country Liberals
(CLP), made patriation of Indigenous land legislation a cause célèbre. The CLP became
notorious for ‘Arcadian populism’.44 Supporters were cast as rugged, pioneering ‘Territor-
ians’. Canberra was an oppressor, strangling the frontier’s prospects. And then there was
the ‘frightening’ Indigenous agenda.45 As Smith observes, for the CLP, ‘Whilst the battle
was about land, the electoral tactics were about race’.46 Those tactics worked; the CLP held
power for 27 unbroken years, earning it the nickname the ‘Territory Party’. (The opposi-
tion Labor Party, though more sympathetic to Indigenous concerns, was also predomi-
nantly settler-oriented. From 1978 to 1998, Indigenous membership in the territorial
legislature never exceeded 2 of 25.47)
The CLP governed as provocatively as it campaigned. Within months of forming gov-
ernment in 1978, it moved to thwart Indigenous land claims by extending the city limits of
major municipalities.48 Had the plan succeeded, Darwin would have expanded 30-fold,
becoming the world’s biggest city. In 1983, when the federal government vowed to
return the territory’s iconic landmark, Uluru, or Ayers Rock, to the Anangu people, the
territory’s chief minister protested with the rallying cry ‘Let’s Rock Canberra’.49 His suc-
cessor boycotted the hand-over ceremony. In 1994 the territory moved to transfer all
Crown land into a territory-owned company, again to defeat land claims. In 1993
another CLP chief minister told international journalists Indigenous peoples were ‘centu-
ries behind us in their cultural attitudes and aspirations’.50 In 1997 a further CLP chief
minister, during a media interview at the territorial legislature, called the Northern
Land Council chair a ‘whingeing, whining, carping black’.51
Integral to the territorial government’s quest for land-control – talismanic, even – was
its push for statehood. In Australia, Indigenous land-rights legislation is typically under
state authority. Hence for territorial settlers, statehood was ‘the lever through which
such control might be wrested from the commonwealth government’.52 Chief Minister
Marshall Perron once characterised statehood as, ‘the stuff that dreams are made on.
This is especially true here in the Northern Territory where successive generations have
been struggling for the degree of control over our affairs that other Australians take for
granted’.53 Unsurprisingly, Indigenous groups opposed statehood. Indigenous leader
Galarrwuy Yunupingu observed, ‘The rallying cry of “Statehood!” has often been the
first sound in a battle to defeat our rights’.54
In 1985 the Northern Territory government officially launched a bid for statehood. To
that end, the legislature established a bipartisan Sessional Committee on Constitutional
Development, comprising three CLP and three Labor members. Public hearings com-
menced in 1988, with visits to 54 communities.55 More than 40 of these were primarily
Indigenous; in some places ‘the entire community of 200 people turned out to have
input’.56 While government and even opposition Labor leaders celebrated these attempts
at consultation, others condemned them as disingenuous, poorly resourced and ‘farci-
cal’.57 Constitutional drafting began in 1990 and continued for half a decade.
Around this time, elsewhere in Australia, Indigenous rights were gaining ground. The
Australian High Court, in its 1992Mabo and 1996Wik decisions, renounced the doctrine
of terra nullius, recognised that Indigenous land title had survived European settlement,
and opened up Crown lands – including leased grazing lands – to native-title claims. In
concession, the federal government passed the 1993 Native Title Act, establishing a legal
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framework for recognition, protection and compensation of native title. While these devel-
opments shook Australia’s states, they were of lesser consequence in the Northern Terri-
tory. There, under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act, Indigenous land-owners had little
incentive to make title claims.58 If anything, these moves toward national reconciliation
prompted settlers in the Northern Territory to speed their bid for control.
With the accession of the CLP’s Shane Stone to the chief ministership in 1995, the
statehood campaign gained momentum. That year the Sessional Committee released a
draft constitution, which was tabled in the assembly.59 In matters of Indigenous rights,
the draft was in ways a compromise. It included a non-binding preamble that would
be the first in Australia to acknowledge the historical role of Indigenous peoples.
Section 2.1.1 proposed to recognise, and perhaps even deem enforceable, Indigenous cus-
tomary law. Section 7.3 authorised the potential enactment of ‘Aboriginal self-determi-
nation’. Finally, in Part 7, the draft sought middle ground on Indigenous land rights.
Rather than patriating the Aboriginal Land Rights Act as regular legislation, as the
CLP preferred, or leaving it in federal hands, as Indigenous groups urged, land rights
would be protected in territorial ‘organic laws’. Unlike regular laws, organic laws
would be amendable only by a super-majority of the territorial legislature. However,
they would also be amendable by a simple majority of voters in a referendum. Moreover,
Indigenous lands would be alienable if a court agreed it was in the landholders’ interest.
And, the bar would be lowered for the taking of Indigenous lands under ‘eminent
domain’.60
In late 1997, Chief Minister Stone, having resoundingly won re-election on a pro-state-
hood platform, and with the statehood-friendly Howard government in Canberra, moved
to bring statehood to fruition. He called a constitutional convention where delegates would
review and finalise the Sessional Committee’s draft constitution. The statehood question
would then go before territorial voters in a referendum. With a majority ‘yes’ vote, and
with the federal government’s approval, the territory would become Australia’s seventh
state, and the Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act would be replaced by the new
constitution.
The Northern Territory Constitutional Convention
The convention took place in Darwin over eight days between 26 March and 9 April 1998.
Even before it began it was dogged by controversy. Of the 53 convention seats, 27 were
reserved for government-appointed delegates. Some were appointed to represent
specific interests; others were ‘special’ delegates with no set constituency. The remaining
26 delegates were chosen by predetermined stakeholder groups. Indigenous stakeholders
were offered nine seats, or 17%. The most influential Indigenous stakeholders, the Central
and Northern Land Councils, were offered just one seat between them. In protest, they
boycotted the convention. Other Indigenous groups, despite reservations, sent delegates
‘to get Indigenous peoples’ views on the record’.61
From the moment of the convention’s opening address the tone was confrontational.
Keynote speaker Frank Alcorta, a former Darwin journalist, though noting the Northern
Territory’s bloody history, stated, ‘a constitution does not have a past’. He urged that the
new constitution not give Indigenous peoples a ‘special place’ – in effect, that it not recog-
nise them as a distinct, rights-bearing demos:
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[I]f that is done, it will be at a horrendous long-term cost because it will entrench difference
and division between the races forever. It will institutionalize Aboriginality precisely at a time
when it is becoming less significant than at any other time in our written history … . The
constitution should be a document that makes absolutely no distinction, none whatsoever,
between one group of people and another.62
Next, each delegate gave an opening statement. More than a dozen, echoing Alcorta,
championed the principles of liberal universalism and equality. For example, special del-
egate Kay Rose stated, ‘I do not believe there are Chinese Territorians, Aboriginal Terri-
torians, Queensland Territorians. There is just one kind – a Territorian’.63 Bob Vander-
Wal, representing small-business interests, attacked Indigenous protections as illiberal:
‘To give people special rights based on their colour in the constitution would make it a
racist document … ’.64 Ed Ferrier, representing seniors, agreed, calling the Aboriginal
Land Rights Act unjust:
One quarter of the Northern Territory population, the Aboriginal quarter, now controls half
the land area …while the three-quarters of the population who are not Aboriginal cannot
enter their half without special permission. … It may not be politically correct to say so,
but the present system is discrimination and segregation based on race, and the name of
that is apartheid.65
Both Pryce Dale, representing youth, and Karen Smith, representing agricultural inter-
ests, urged that the constitution infix universalism by referring only to ‘we the people’.66
Gino Antonino, representing ethnic communities, said the same: ‘With all due respect to
our Aboriginal friends, I do not think there is a place in a constitution for land rights or
specific rights … . The wording of the constitution should refer only to ‘we, the Australian
people’.67
Indigenous delegates challenged these ostensibly liberal appeals. For example, Josie
Crawshaw, representing the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, con-
demned settler universalism and proclaimed the justice of Indigenous self-determination:
‘All of the efforts through history to define us simply as Australians and to treat us on
terms set by the majority culture have, in fact, denied us our rightful place in this land’.68
On the morning of the convention’s second day, Denis Burke, a CLP government min-
ister, tabled an alternate draft constitution – an ostensibly egalitarian document he called
‘as simple as possible’,69 with no mention of land rights, self-determination or customary
law. The move outraged non-CLP delegates, including John Ah Kit, an Indigenous Labor
Party member of the legislative assembly (MLA), who stated: ‘We have the Indigenous del-
egates coming in here in a spirit of reconciliation. Now we have seen 12 years’ work
thrown out and a takeover by a document that surfaced … to hijack the process. It is
all a set-up’.70
After Burke’s alternate draft constitution was tabled, delegates continued with opening
statements, many similar in tone to the day before, decrying Indigenous difference as illib-
eral. Eventually Indigenous special delegate Gatjil Djerrkura rose on a point of order, to
‘draw a line in the sand and say that enough is enough. …When you talk about a
simple constitution, really you are talking about a document that keeps us invisible’.71
He warned that if Indigenous delegates’ concerns were not addressed – if they were not
recognised in the constitution as, in effect, first-order rights-bearers – they might leave
the convention.
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Through the next few days, as delegates discussed the new state’s legislative, executive,
financial and judicial functions, almost no mention was made of Indigenous matters.
Then, on the morning of the fifth day, debate commenced on Part 2 of the draft consti-
tution, concerning the proposed legal system of the new state, including special
‘organic’ laws. Several delegates expressed opposition, including James Robertson, repre-
senting the territorial government, who characterised ‘organic’ laws as offensive to equal
rights:
Let us not hide from the real reason why organic laws are suggested in the [draft consti-
tution]. It is not an accident. It is to try to accommodate the position that relates to 25
percent of our population. … [They] will have laws relating to their land that will see it
dealt with differently from the land of 75 percent of the people that comes under different
laws. I simply ask delegates if that is what we want our subsequent generations to inherit.
My answer is no.72
Special delegate Kay Rose stated, ‘I believe firmly that all men and women are created
equal. I do not like the thought of a law that would upset that concept… ’.73 Later that
same afternoon, George Roussos, representing ethnic communities, moved Motion 25,
that the constitution eschew special ‘organic’ laws. As well, Lawrence Ah Toy, representing
agricultural interests, moved Motion 28, endorsing ‘the absolute and unqualified equality
of all its people as the fundamental platform upon which all laws of the state shall be based
… ’.74 Both motions – the former decrying upstream boundaries, the latter cheering down-
stream rights – were moved to the resolutions group to be drafted into formal resolutions,
which would be voted on at the end of the convention.
That afternoon there occurred what for Indigenous peoples was ‘the coup of the con-
vention’.75 Special delegate Djiniyini Gondarra advanced Motion 32, that ‘Aboriginal cus-
tomary law be recognized as a source of law in the constitution’.76 Six other Indigenous
delegates spoke in favour. John Ah Kit stated, ‘It is beyond the pale to accept that we
should stand by and watch as people try to wind back the clock to the frontier days of
this land. … Today we strive for justice’.77 In the course of the ensuing 90-minute
debate, several previous opponents of Indigenous customary law, including Dennis
Burke, pronounced themselves converts.78 Gondarra’s motion was advanced to the resol-
utions group.
The sixth day of the convention was devoted to Part 7 of the draft constitution, dealing
with Indigenous rights. Gatjil Djerrkura proposed Motion 45, that land rights remain
under federal jurisdiction, constitutionally exempted from the authority of the new
state. He stated:
[W]e have no reason to trust the Northern Territory government … . We say it for the very
good reason that the government has spent taxpayers’ money to oppose every single land
claim made under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act since 1976, and we say it because, at
every opportunity, the government has said that it would remove some of our rights if it
gains control of the act.79
Fellow Indigenous delegates spoke in favour, as did Charlie Phillips, a non-Indigenous
delegate representing labour interests, who stated, ‘I say again you cannot build statehood
on the coffin of Indigenous rights’.80 The motion was referred to the resolutions group.
That same day, in the opposite vein, Motion 51, moved by special delegate Julian Swin-
stead, called on Indigenous land-rights legislation to be transferred to the territory as
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ordinary law without constitutional protection. Supporters included Gino Antonino, who
appealed for Indigenous bounding – demotic, cultural, economic – into the settler demos:
I think all these laws and all these requests for laws do nothing but separate the races. They
are all trying to put the Aboriginals back where they came from, in a tribal situation. What is
wrong with that? There is nothing wrong, if they were to live by themselves … . But it is very,
very wrong because Aboriginal tribal life and culture are the antithesis of the dynamic
economy of the year 2000.81
Meanwhile, special delegate Nigel Scullion moved Motion 52, ‘That the constitution, so
as to preserve the indissoluble nature of the Northern Territory, not include a specific
clause relating to Aboriginal self-determination’.82 In defending this motion Scullion
stated,
When I came to this convention, I had a vision of we, as a people … black, white and brindle
together, living as one. In terms of sovereignty, that vision does not really include a federation
of the Northern Territory made up of a black, independent state… .83
Djerrkura disagreed: ‘To gain the consent of Aboriginal Territorians to statehood, a new
constitution must recognize … as do governments all over the world, that Indigenous
people have inherent rights to govern ourselves’.84 Both Scullion’s and Swinstead’s
motions advanced to the resolutions group.
On the seventh day of the convention, several more controversial motions appeared.
Chris Lugg, a CLP MLA, proposed Motion 40, overhauling the preamble to declare, in
capital letters, the territory’s devotion to holistic equality:
NOW WE THE PEOPLE OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY, proudly calling ourselves
Territorians, wishing to preserve a harmonious, tolerant, culturally diverse and united
society, and affirming our intention that the life and liberty and property of all the people
of the Territory should be protected and that all shall stand as equals before the law in enjoy-
ment of that protection, declare this to be the Constitution of the State of the Northern
Territory.85
Djerrkura protested, asserting justification for Indigenous first-order difference: ‘In
coming here, we have sought recognition in the preamble … . We have no links to
other lands and cultures. It is here that you find our Jerusalem, our London, our Rome,
our beginning. This is our land’.86 Lugg’s motion was referred to the resolutions group.
In the afternoon, as the plenary sessions were wrapping up, Djerrkura announced he
and his fellow Indigenous-group delegates were leaving. The walkout ‘threw the statehood
convention into turmoil’.87 Josie Crawshaw told the media, ‘We just aren’t going to be
conned into colluding in our own oppression’.88 Labor-appointed delegate Bob Collins
called the walkout ‘appalling’ and ‘a real blow to reconciliation and race relations in the
territory’.89 The final remaining Indigenous delegate, Labor MLA John Ah Kit, replied,
I think the outburst from delegate Collins is appalling. … I have made a quick analysis of
motions put up with regard to Indigenous concerns and, for every one of those, there has
been a counter-motion knocking or defeating or wanting to defeat it.90
Collins retorted, ‘That is called democracy’,91 in effect defending the notion that bounding
may be done by majority rule.
On the morning of the eighth and final day of the convention, Charlie Phillips declared
that in solidarity with Indigenous delegates he too was leaving. The remainder of the day
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was devoted to voting on the resolutions. For much of it John Ah Kit abstained, telling the
media, ‘This is a bulldozing, rubber-stamping exercise I’m not going to be a party to’.92
The vote results were no surprise. Concerning the preamble, Resolution 2, based on a
motion by Djerrkura, calling for ‘recognition that Aboriginal people have continuing
rights by virtue of their status as the Northern Territory’s Indigenous peoples’ and ‘a
respect for Aboriginal rights in land and for Aboriginal cultural heritage’,93 was defeated
through a show of hands. Instead, by a vote of 26 in favour, the convention adopted Chris
Lugg’s liberal preamble.
Resolution 6, that ‘Aboriginal customary law is recognized as a source of law’ and that it
be enacted as written law following consultations with Indigenous groups, carried with just
two dissenting votes. However, support for that resolution was used to justify removing
protections for Indigenous self-determination. Said Bob Collins, ‘We now have a much
stronger proposition in terms of the ultimate self-determination of Aboriginal people
than we ever expected to have … . So 7.3 [the self-determination section] simply is
unnecessary’.94 The section was eliminated by a vote of 32–10.
Concerning Indigenous land rights, Resolution 49, resolving that the Aboriginal Land
Rights Act remain federal legislation and ‘the principles underpinning such legislation that
protects Aboriginal rights be anchored in the new constitution’, was defeated 26–10.
Instead, by a show of hands, supermajoritarian ‘organic laws’ were removed from the con-
stitution, eliminating the possibility of guarding Indigenous lands in that manner. Then,
by a 32–10 vote, all references to the protection of Indigenous land and sacred sites were
cut.
In the end, following votes on 59 resolutions, much of the work of the bipartisan Ses-
sional Committee was rejected, as were almost all proposals by Indigenous delegates. The
revised draft constitution affirmed Indigenous customary law but made no mention of
self-determination or land-rights protection, thus framing the territory as a single, holistic
demos committed to individual equality and majority rule. The delegates had responded to
the boundary question – to ‘who are the people and where do they rule?’ –with the answer,
‘all of us indivisibly, over all of the territory’. In his final act as chair of the convention,
Austin Asche gave one last cheer for such universalism, proclaiming: ‘We are all Territor-
ians, thank heavens. We are extraordinarily lucky to live in this place and so extraordi-
narily lucky to have had a hand in pushing this wonderful territory forward to become
the seventh and best state of Australia’.95
The Kalkaringi and Batchelor conventions
In August 1998 the Northern Territory legislature adopted the statehood convention’s
revised draft constitution. Australian Prime Minister John Howard then announced his
government would grant statehood to the territory subject to a ‘yes’ vote in a territory-
wide referendum. The referendum was scheduled for 3 October 1998. Voters would be
asked, ‘Now that a constitution for the state of the Northern Territory has been rec-
ommended by the statehood convention and endorsed by the Northern Territory Parlia-
ment: Do you agree that we should become a state?’.
Indigenous groups ‘immediately damned’ the statehood convention’s revised draft con-
stitution and mobilised in opposition to statehood.96 Key in that effort were two Indigen-
ous constitutional conventions. The first met from 17–20 August at Kalkaringi. It drew
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Indigenous, federal and territorial leaders and more than 700 other attendees from 15
Indigenous nations, who ‘camped in the heat and dust for several days and talked of
their concern for families, communities and lands, and how to develop their vision of
the future and plan for its implementation’.97
Delegates unanimously condemned the Northern Territory’s bid for statehood under
the revised draft constitution. As well, ‘Many delegates criticized the government’s
failure to consult with Aboriginal representatives in relation to statehood, as well as
the inadequate acknowledgement of Aboriginal law and Aboriginal rights in the
draft constitution’.98 Galarrwuy Yunupingu told the audience, ‘Our voice has not
been heard in the NT Government’s current proposal. The question is: Will the North-
ern Territory Government engage with Aboriginal people in a real debate about state-
hood and the constitution?’.99 Dennis Burke, the territorial government’s representative
at the convention, was unapologetic in his commitment to a liberal charter, telling
attendees: ‘The constitution is for all Territorians. Aboriginal people are 30 percent
and are very important, not because you are Aboriginal but because you are
Territorians’.100
On the final day of the convention, delegates adopted the Kalkaringi Statement. Its pre-
amble began:
The Aboriginal Nations of Central Australia are governed by our own constitutions (being
our systems of Aboriginal law and Aboriginal structures of law and governance, which
have been in place since time immemorial). Our constitutions must be recognized on a
basis of equality, co-existence and mutual respect with any constitution of the Northern
Territory.101
The preamble further noted the decades of hostility directed at Indigenous peoples by
successive Northern Territory governments and lamented the failings of the revised draft
constitution.
After the preamble, the Kalkaringi Statement made a series of pronouncements. Key
among these was that consent to statehood would be withheld until ‘good-faith nego-
tiations’ with Indigenous peoples ‘leading to a constitution based upon equality, co-exist-
ence and mutual respect’.102 The federal government was enjoined to directly fund
Indigenous communities rather than entrust such moneys to the territorial government,
and to conduct an inquiry into the experience of Indigenous peoples under Northern Ter-
ritory self-government.
The statement then demanded constitutional recognition of Indigenous peoples’
‘inherent right to self-government’. (Dunstan reports that among settlers this demand
was a ‘bombshell’, alienating some who understood it as a call for secession.103) The state-
ment insisted the territorial government affirm Indigenous peoples’ status as a discrete
polity, by negotiating on ‘the sharing of power’, providing ‘effective levels of represen-
tation’ in the territorial legislature, and insuring ‘that any changes to a Northern Territory
constitution which concern Aboriginal rights … be approved not only a by a majority of
electors at a referendum but also by a majority of people of the Aboriginal nations of the
Northern Territory’.104 Finally, the statement insisted Indigenous land rights remain a
federal rather than territorial matter, that sacred sites be protected, and that the territorial
constitution ‘recognize Aboriginal law through Aboriginal law makers, and Aboriginal
structures of law and governance’.
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The second Indigenous constitutional convention met 30 November–4 December in
the town of Batchelor. More than 120 delegates attended from across the territory. In
anticipation of the event Yunupingu told the media, ‘Either we get action or we actively
fight against statehood’.105 Chief Minister Stone was invited to attend but declined,
telling the media, ‘Reconciliation seems to have become a one-way street. It’s either
done Mr Yunupingu’s way or there’s no reconciliation. People are sick of being lectured,
hectored and stood over’.106
The convention endorsed the Kalkaringi Statement and pressed the territorial govern-
ment to commit to several constitutional principles, including that the outcome of the
convention be respected as Indigenous peoples’ authoritative political position. The con-
vention further produced 42 ‘Resolutions of the Northern Territory Aboriginal Nations on
Standards for Constitutional Development’. Most fleshed out Kalkaringi pronouncements.
For example, the Batchelor delegates resolved to explore enhancing political participation
in the territory, possibly through first-order means such as ‘reserved Aboriginal seats in
parliament’ or ‘special assemblies for Indigenous peoples and issues’. As well, they
called for research on reducing ‘the impact of white law on Aboriginal people’.107 Other
Batchelor resolutions were entirely new, including rejecting a federal report on the Abori-
ginal Land Rights Act that proposed weakening the permit system regulating access to
Indigenous land.
It can be seen, then, that at Batchelor, and before that at Kalkraingi, Indigenous del-
egates responded to the boundary question far differently than had settlers at the
Darwin statehood convention. Rather than defining ‘who are the people’ as all Territor-
ians, Indigenous delegates insisted that constitutional boundaries demarcate their own
specific demoi. Opposing universalism, they called for recognition of their political self-
hood, so as to self-determine. And, rather than defining ‘where do they rule’ as coextensive
with the territory as a whole, they called for the bounding of their own discrete homelands
and sacred sites. Again, contrary to settler holism, they pressed to infix distinctions
between ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’, ‘us’ and ‘them’.
Between the Kalkaringi and Batchelor conventions came the 3 October statehood refer-
endum. In the lead-up, Indigenous opposition was intense. The Northern and Central
Land Councils targeted Indigenous voters with newspaper and radio advertisements
urging a ‘no’ vote. In the Land Rights News, published by the land councils, a cartoon
associating statehood with white supremacy was blasted by territorial government
leaders as ‘racially divisive’.108 The CLP accused land-council officials of fear-mongering
to guard their personal power. The CLP also accused Labor of ‘playing a double game’ by
formally backing statehood while campaigning against it in the bush.109 Yet because state-
hood officially had bipartisan support, all public-information materials championed the
‘yes’ case.110 Most commentators predicted statehood would win easily.111
Yet on voting day statehood was rejected by a ‘no’ vote of 51.3%. The result was a shock,
prompting immediate post-mortems. Labor suggested statehood had been fumbled away
by the CLP’s arrogance, especially its manipulation of the constitutional convention. The
CLP attributed the loss to voters’ concerns regarding the future state’s finances. Yet ballot
returns revealed that in urban areas, ‘yes’ had won. ‘No’ votes, meanwhile, were extremely
high at remote ‘mobile voting booths’, serving predominantly Indigenous voters. All but
one mobile booth recorded an overwhelming ‘no’ vote. Overall, 73.3% of mobile voters
rejected statehood.112 According to Heatley, ‘there is little doubt Aboriginal opposition
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was the strongest factor in producing the negative outcome’.113 Indeed, the academic con-
sensus was that Northern Territory statehood was ‘lost in the bush’.114
Analysis and conclusion
This article presented a theory of the metapolitics of settler colonialism, employing it to
examine the 1998 statehood campaign in Australia’s Northern Territory. In doing so,
this article made three contributions. First, it showcased how settler colonialism can be
understood as at base metapolitical – how settler colonies are ‘constituted’ by dissolving
Indigenous demotic and territorial boundaries and replacing them with new, broader
boundaries within which settlers dominate. Put another way, settler colonialism
nullifies Indigenous answers to the ‘boundary problem’, redefining ‘who are the people
and where do they rule’ so the settler ‘us’ and ‘ours’ absorb the Indigenous ‘them’ and
‘theirs’.
As was displayed, the Northern Territory Constitutional Convention was rife with rhe-
torical attacks on the legitimacy of Indigenous boundaries. Indigenous demotic and terri-
torial difference (e.g. a ‘special place’, a ‘tribal situation’, a ‘division between the races’) was
variously condemned as a historical artefact, unsuited to the ‘dynamic economy of the year
2000’; as divisive, serving to ‘separate the races’ and prevent ‘black, white and brindle
together, living as one’; and as undesirable for ‘subsequent generations to inherit’.
Instead, settler delegates maintained the new state should constitute a uniform people
and place – that it should be ‘harmonious’, ‘indissoluble’, a ‘united society’, making ‘no
distinction, none whatsoever, between one group of people and another’, consisting
only of ‘we the people’ or ‘Territorians’.
Such views were then etched into the new state’s founding document. By declining to
enshrine Indigenous self-determination or guard the Aboriginal Land Rights Act, settler
delegates framed a constitution that would expunge Indigenous peoples as a collective
first-order polity. Instead, politically atomised and territorially dispossessed, Indigenous
peoples would be subsumed into a new, all-inclusive, ‘Territorian’ polity, delimited only
by ‘we the people’. Within that new polity, settlers, due to the democratisation of property
rights, would enjoy unfettered access to land. Moreover, by dint of their greater numbers,
they would wield majority rule.
Second, this article displayed how such a transformation may be engineered using
liberal rights. During the statehood convention, settlers complained that, under existing
law, they were denied both political equality and fair access to land. This, settlers
argued, was ‘discrimination’, ‘segregation’, even ‘apartheid’. The prospect of infixing
such mistreatment in the new state constitution was said to be ‘horrendous’, ‘racist’,
and offensive to the principle ‘that all men and women are created equal’.
Yet the right of equality invoked by settlers is, as has been shown, an individual, second-
order right. Second-order rights are inevitably constrained by upstream, first-order
bounding decisions, made to facilitate the self-determination of political communities.
Where such bounding decisions are entrenched or otherwise deemed legitimate, their
downstream effects are irreversible. However, where such bounding decisions are not
entrenched, then individual-rights charges may push upstream, challenging the legitimacy
of, and potentially toppling, extant political communities. If ‘they’ and ‘theirs’ are dis-
solved, the jurisdiction is re-bound.
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It seems clear this was the aim of settlers at the Northern Territory statehood conven-
tion. The discrimination they cited was not, in their telling, an epiphenomenal conse-
quence of upstream, first-order Indigenous self-determination. Rather, they maintained
that Indigenous peoples were, in effect, akin to the Alabama counties in Reynolds – entities
that ‘never were and never have been considered as sovereign’. Instead, Indigenous people
were fellow ‘Territorians’, with no right to invidiously discriminate against their co-citi-
zens. In this manner, settlers attacked the legitimacy of Indigenous difference. They
then appealed for the oppressive laws to be reformed – indeed, for those reforms to be
anchored in the new state constitution. Going forward, bias would be abolished and all
individuals would be equal. Such liberalisation, though pitched as a seemingly innocuous
second-order reform, would have transformative upstream impacts, swallowing Indigen-
ous polities into the greater settler demos.
Third and finally, this article showed that when Indigenous peoples resisted such settler
manoeuvres by championing the constitutional entrenchment of their own first-order
demotic and territorial status, there ensued a clash over the appropriate ‘framing of
justice’ – over whether first-order Indigenous boundaries or second-order liberal rights
should be seen as the legitimate ‘subject of justice’ in the founding of Australia’s
seventh state.
At the statehood convention, and then at the Indigenous constitutional conventions at
Kalkaringi and Batchelor, Indigenous leaders proclaimed their peoples were legitimate
first-order political communities, with ancient, sacrosanct ties to their homeland and
‘no links to other lands and cultures’. Vowing to ‘strive for justice’ and secure ‘our rightful
place in this land’, they called for the constitutional affirmation of their special status,
including their ‘inherent right to self-government’, power-sharing, reserved seats in par-
liament, and the protection of their customary laws, lands and sacred sites. In effect,
they likened their position to that of Wyoming in the US Senate – a sovereign, respect
for whose boundaries must trump downstream individual rights.
So, would first-order Indigenous boundaries or second-order liberal rights prevail as
the legitimate ‘subject of justice’ in the constitution of the new state? Indigenous actors
won this clash, prevailing upon Indigenous voters, and perhaps other supporters, to
vote in accordance with the view that the appropriate ‘subject of justice’ was Indigenous
boundaries. Settlers, unable to dissolve the Indigenous ‘them’ into the settler ‘us’, failed to
achieve power over Indigenous peoples and lands. They could not ‘constitute settler
colonialism’.
It was a substantial victory. Five months after the referendum, Shane Stone was
removed as chief minister. In 2001, for the first time since territorial self-government,
the CLP lost power to the Labor Party. Today the Northern Territory is still not a state.
Subsequent statehood campaigns have foundered, vanishing into the gulf separating
settler and Indigenous ambitions. Nor has the territory patriated the Aboriginal Land
Rights Act. And a treaty process is underway, perhaps promising recognition of the sort
of Indigenous rights demanded at Kalkaringi and Batchelor.
Still, the security of Indigenous boundaries remains elusive. In 2007 the federal Howard
government staged the notorious Northern Territory Intervention. Conducted ostensibly
to interdict the flow of alcohol and drugs into Indigenous communities, and to stem a pur-
ported epidemic of child sexual abuse, Canberra unilaterally suspended elements of the
Aboriginal Land Rights Act and severely curtailed Indigenous self-determination. At the
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same time, the territorial government in Darwin introduced its ‘super shires’ reforms, dis-
solving community level governments often controlled by Indigenous people in favour of
more expansive, regional-level governments where settlers dominate. On Australia’s ‘last
frontier’, the metapolitical contest wears on.
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